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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This case addresses the enforceability of forum selection clauses requiring arbitration to

occur outside ofldaho. In September 2018, Respondents Chris and Daniel Salvador sold 51 % of
their business to Appellants ("Investors"), a group of four closely-related entities. To effectuate
the sale, the parties signed three related agreements with nearly identical forum selection clauses,
requiring all disputes to be arbitrated in California. In May 2019, a dispute arose between the
parties concerning the agreements. The Salvadors suggested that the parties resolve all of their
claims through a single arbitration. The Investors insisted on dividing the dispute into two
parallel arbitrations, one arbitration in Idaho to address claims arising from one of the
agreements, and a separate arbitration in California to address claims arising from the remaining
two agreements.
The Investors filed a lawsuit in Idaho seeking to compel an Idaho arbitration on one of
the agreements, asserting that Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) prohibited enforcement of the
California forum selection clause. The Salvadors then moved the Idaho court to compel the
parties to arbitrate all disputes in a consolidated Idaho arbitration, due to Idaho's public policy
against the enforcement of forum selection clauses requiring arbitration outside of Idaho. LC.
§ 29-110(1 ). Additionally, the Salvadors explained that practical reasons (such as judicial
economy and the risk of inconsistent judgments) and legal reasons (such as this Court's recent
decision in T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., "T3") supported a
consolidated arbitration in Idaho. The Idaho district court agreed, ordering the parties to arbitrate
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all claims arising from all of the agreements in a single Idaho arbitration. The district court relied
heavily on this Court's decision in T3.
On appeal, the Investors urge this Court to reverse the district court and order the parties
to conduct separate parallel arbitrations in Idaho and California. Dividing the dispute into two
arbitrations serves no rational purpose, except to drastically increase the cost of the proceedings
for both parties. Given the litigation resource disparity between the Salvadors and the Investors,
given that the parties' arbitration claims arise from the same transaction, and given the absence
of any legal reason to divide the dispute into parallel arbitrations, it appears the Investors' goal is
to make this litigation as expensive as possible for the Salvadors in an attempt to outspend them
and force them to concede. Notably, the Investors do not deny that this is their goal.
For these reasons, the Salvadors respectfully request that this Court affirm the district
court's decision, based on T3, and require the parties to arbitrate their disputes in a single Idaho
arbitration.

B.

Statement of Facts.
Lacking in authority, the Investors' Opening Brief resorts to hyperbole to distort the facts

and distract this Court from the relevant law (namely, T3). The Investors denigrate the Salvadors
with pejorative accusations, including that the Salvadors "concealed material information,"
"fail[ ed] to disclose a known $980,000 liability," and induced the Investors to invest in OSS via
fraud. (Appellants' Br. 1, 6-7.) Tellingly, the Investors do not support their accusations with
citations to the record. (Id.) Indeed, but for the litigation privilege, the Investors' baseless
statements would constitute actionable defamation. See Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R.
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Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669, 678, 434 P.3d 1275, 1284 (2019). The Salvadors categorically deny
the Investors' baseless accusations, and the Salvadors respectfully suggest a return to the record
and the law to resolve this appeal. To that end, below is a summary of the objective facts, which
are supported by the record. Additionally, it may be helpful to reference the Idaho court's and the
California court's summary of the facts. (See R. 862-65, 866-68).
1.

The parties.

To avoid confusion, it is important to clarify the parties involved in this appeal. Daniel
and Chris Salvador are brothers who formed a trucking company, Off-Spec Solutions, LLC

("OSS") in 2009. (R. 584.) The Salvadors grew OSS into a successful business, and in
September 2018, the Salvadors sold a 51 % membership interest in OSS to the Investors. (R. 584,
862, 867.)
The Investors consist of four closely-related entities. The Investors used Transportation
Investors, LLC ("TI") to purchase the 51 % membership interest in OSS from the Salvadors.
(R. 228-29, 862, 867.) Tl's purchase of the 51 % membership interest in OSS was facilitated and
financed by the Investors' private equity hedge funds, Central Valley Fund II, L.P. and Central
Valley Fund III (SBIC), L.P. (collectively "CVF"), which Investors admit are affiliates of TI.
(R. 228, 512.) Upon purchasing the 51 % membership interest in OSS, the Investors controlled a
majority of the company, thus, OSS became the fourth entity under the Investors' control.
(R.511.)
As a practical matter, the Investors can be viewed as a single party because there is
significant overlap between them. For example, the parties' agreement identifies CVF as Tl's
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affiliate, and the Investors admit the same. (R. 228, 502, 749.) The overlap between the
Investors' entities is further demonstrated by the fact that the same individual, Mr. Jose Blanco,
serves as the manager of TI and OSS and the authorized agent of CVF. (R. 17, 511.)
Mr. Bianco's colleagues are similarly involved in more than one of the Investors' entities.
(R. 207-08, 235, 255, 291.) The Investors disingenuously claimed that they should be viewed as
separate entities, but the Idaho district court rejected that argument, concluding that the "real
parties in interest are the same." (R. 502, 870.) Therefore, TI, CVF, and OSS should all be
viewed as a single entity, i.e., the Investors, for purposes of this appeal.

2.

The Salvadors sell 51 % of their company to the Investors.

On September 10, 2018, the Salvadors sold 51 % of their membership interest in OSS to
the Investors (the "Sale"). (R. 219-367, 511, 862, 867.) In connection with the Sale, the parties
executed several agreements, which the parties defined as "Related Documents." (R. 309.) Three
of the Related Documents are relevant to this appeal. First, the parties executed a Membership
Interest Purchase Agreement ("MIPA"), through which the Salvadors sold a 51 % membership
interest in OSS to the Investors. (R. 219-367.) Second, the parties executed an LLC Agreement
to govern OSS's post-Sale operations. (R. 368--442.) Third, the Salvadors both signed
Employment Agreements with OSS, through which they remained as officers and employees of
OSS post-Sale. (R. 443-63.)
For the purposes of this appeal, the only relevant portions of these agreements are the
governing law and the forum selection clauses. The agreements' forum selection clauses are
nearly identical, requiring arbitration to occur in California. (R. 283, 428, 448, 459.) With regard
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to the governing law, the Employment Agreements are governed by Idaho law, and the MIPA
and LLC Agreement are governed by California law. (R. 283, 428, 449, 460.) The relevant
excerpts of the agreements are outlined below.

Employment Agreement
8.5. Location of Arbitration. Any arbitration hearing shall be conducted m
Sacramento County, California.
8.6. Applicable Law. The law applicable to the arbitration of any Dispute shall be
the law of the state of Idaho, excluding its conflicts of law rules.
(R. 448--49, 459-60.)

LLC Agreement
19.20.2. Initiation of Arbitration; Selection of Arbitrators; Location of Arbitration
and Applicable Law. . . . Any arbitration hearing shall be conducted in
Sacramento County, California. The law applicable to the arbitration of any
dispute shall be the law of the State of California, excluding its conflicts of law
rules.
(R. 428.)

MIPA
13.2(b). Initiation of Arbitration; Selection of Arbitrators; Location of Arbitration
and Applicable Law. . . . Any arbitration hearing shall be conducted in
Sacramento County, California. The law applicable to the arbitration of any
dispute shall be the law of the State of California, excluding its conflicts of law
rules.
(R. 283.)

3.

The Investors unexpectedly terminate the Salvadors' employment with OSS,
and the Investors dilute the Salvadors' ownership in OSS.

After the Sale, and pursuant to the Employment Agreements, the Salvadors remained
employees and officers of OSS, until on or around May 29, 2019, when the Investors terminated
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the Salvadors' employment with OSS. (R. 19, 584.) The Salvadors allege that the termination of
their employment was wrongful and without cause. (R. 584, 211-12.) The Salvadors were
pressured to sign a separation agreement requiring them to waive all claims against OSS, but the
Salvadors refused to sign the agreement and instead sought legal counsel. (R. 584).
Despite the termination of their employment, the Salvadors remained as members of the
OSS Management Committee by virtue of their ownership interest in OSS. (R. 584.) Through a
series of financial transactions, the Investors diluted the Salvadors' ownership in OSS. (R. 585,
699.) At the time this case was before the Idaho district court, the Salvadors' collective
ownership in OSS had been diluted from 49% to 1.5%. (R. 585, 699.) The Salvadors allege that
the Investors diluted their interest in bad faith. (R. 211-1 7.)

4.

Disputes arise between the parties relating to the Sale, the MIPA, the LLC
Agreement, and the Employment Agreements.

Shortly after the Investors terminated the Salvadors' employment, the parties exchanged
e-mails discussing their respective claims against one another. (R. 54-70, 179-85, 515-518.)
Many of the parties' claims stemmed from the Sale and alleged breaches of the MIP A, the LLC
Agreement, and the Employment Agreements. (Id.) Because many of the claims involved the
same parties and arose from the same transaction, the Salvadors suggested that the parties
attempt to negotiate a global settlement. (R. 54-57, 588.) Specifically, on May 30 and 31, 2019,
the Salvadors' counsel e-mailed the Investors' respective counsel, suggesting that the parties
discuss a potential global settlement. (Id.)
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5.

TI refuses to negotiate a settlement, and TI informally demands a California
arbitration to resolve Tl's claims related to the MIPA.

Instead of discussing a global settlement, TI sent the Salvadors an informal arbitration
demand claiming that the Salvadors breached the MIPA. (R. 587-89, 592-601.) At the time, TI
did not file its arbitration demand with any court, instead opting to merely mail the Salvadors the
informal demand for a California arbitration. (R. 587-89.) A few days later, the Salvadors
traveled to the Investors' office, in Davis, California, hoping to negotiate the parties' claims in
good faith, but the Investors refused to negotiate. (R. 583-85.)

6.

OSS also refuses to negotiate a settlement, and OSS informally demands a
separate Idaho arbitration to resolve OSS's claims related to the
Employment Agreements.

On or around June 14, 2019, the Salvadors reiterated their suggestion to negotiate a
global settlement between all parties. (R. 587-89.) Instead of discussing a potential negotiation,
on or around June 25, 2019, OSS sent the Salvadors an informal Demand for Arbitration in
Idaho, wherein OSS asserted that the Salvadors breached their Employment Agreements.
(R. 587-89, 603-13.) At the time, OSS did not file its arbitration demand with any court, instead
opting to merely mail the Salvadors the informal Idaho arbitration demand. (R. 54, 60-70.)

7.

To avoid duplicitous and parallel arbitrations in Idaho and California, the
Salvadors suggest that all of the parties' claims should be resolved in a single,
consolidated arbitration.

By making two separate arbitration demands, one in Idaho and one in California, the
Investors attempted to make the Salvadors defend two parallel arbitrations. (R. 587-89.) The
Salvadors did not have a significant preference between arbitrating in Idaho or California, as
long as all claims were consolidated into one arbitration. (R. 567-68, 864.) To that end, and
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consistent with the California forum selection clauses in all of the agreements, the Salvadors'
counsel sent an e-mail to the Investors' counsel, stating: "all arbitration proceedings should
proceed in a single arbitration in California, and that is likely how we will proceed." (R. 184-85,
587-589.) Eager to reach the merits of the dispute, the Salvadors attempted to proceed with a
consolidated California arbitration by proposing three arbitrators based in Northern California.
(R. 184, 517.)

8.

The Investors initiate the Idaho Action.

Instead of agreeing to a consolidated California arbitration, the Investors (through OSS)
filed a lawsuit in Idaho district court (the "Idaho Action") on August 15, 2019, by filing an
Application to Compel Arbitration in Idaho ("Idaho Petition"). (R. 8-19, 867.) The Investors'
Idaho Petition was the first document to be filed with any court in this dispute (Idaho or
California). (Compare R. 8-19 with R. 518, 863-64, and 867.)
The Salvadors were somewhat surprised by the Investors' decision to initiate the Idaho
Action because the Salvadors had recently proposed three California arbitrators and were hopeful
that the Investors would agree to a consolidated California arbitration. (R. 184, 517.) In any
event, the Salvadors did not have a significant preference regarding whether the consolidated
arbitration occurred in Idaho or California, as long as all claims were resolved by one
consolidated arbitration. (R. 567-68, 864.) Seeing as the Investors had initiated the Idaho Action,
the Salvadors followed suit, and on September 24, 2019, the Salvadors filed a Cross-Application
to Compel a Consolidated Arbitration in Idaho ("Cross Petition") to resolve all of the claims
between the parties. (R. 193-218.)
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9.

Two months later, the Investors initiate the California Action.

On October 18, 2019, the Investors (through TI and CVF) initiated the underlying
California superior court case ("California Action") by filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration
in California ("California Petition"). (R. 746-53, 863, 867); Transp. Investors, LLC v.

Salvador, et al., Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00267128. When the
Investors initiated the California Action, the Idaho Action had already been pending for more
than two months. (R. 8-19, 746-53, 863, 867.)

10.

The Idaho court and the California court are asked to rule on the same issues
at around the same time.

The Investors unnecessarily complicated the procedures of this case by filing the Idaho
Action and the California Action, thereby asking both courts to resolve the same issues around
the same time. (R. 746-53, 862-65, 867-68.) The Investors' counsel admitted that he had never
seen such a "procedural morass," and the Investors speciously blamed the Salvadors for initiating
parallel proceedings in the Idaho and California courts. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 13, 38:16-18.); (R. 498.)
These assertions are contrary to the record, which demonstrates that the Investors initiated the
parallel proceedings in Idaho and California, and the Salvadors filed the Cross Petition in Idaho
only after the Investors had already initiated the Idaho Action. (R. 8-9, 862-65, 867-68.)
In an attempt to leapfrog the California Action in front of the Idaho Action, the Investors
filed a Motion to Stay the Idaho Action on December 23, 2019. (R. 623-37.) To maintain the
Idaho Action's priority, the Salvadors filed a Motion to Stay the California Action on January 2,
2020, arguing that the matter should be resolved by the Idaho court. (R. 755-70, 863.)
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11.

The Idaho district court and the California superior court hear oral
argument on the pending motions and petitions, and the California superior
court grants the Salvadors' Motion to Stay the California Action.

On January 9, 2020, the Idaho district court heard oral argument on the Investors' Idaho
Petition and Motion to Stay, and the Salvadors' Cross Petition. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 1-18.) The Idaho
court took the matter under advisement and requested that the parties provide updates on any
developments from the California Action. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 16, 49:4-18.)
On January 24, 2020, the California superior court heard oral argument on the Investors'
California Petition and the Salvadors' Motion to Stay. (R. 818--45.) Consistent with California
procedure, on the day before the oral argument, the California court issued a tentative ruling,
indicating that the court was inclined to grant the Salvadors' Motion to Stay. (R. 807-16.)
Approximately two weeks later, the California court granted the Salvadors' Motion to Stay,
deferring to the Idaho Action because the Idaho Action was filed first. (R. 864.)
Two holdings from the California court's decision are especially noteworthy. First, the
California court rejected the Investors' argument that the Salvadors acted in bad faith by moving
to stay the California Action. (R. 864.) The court emphasized that the Salvadors' actions did not
demonstrate bad faith "especially since the Salvadors were willing to have all claims (involving
both OSS and Petitioners) heard in one forum (either California or Idaho), yet OSS file[ d] its
application in Idaho." (Id.) In other words, the court recognized that the Salvadors acted
reasonably by offering to submit to a consolidated arbitration in Idaho or California, yet the
Investors created a procedural problem by filing parallel proceedings in Idaho and California.
Second, in response to the Investors' argument that the Salvadors should not be rewarded for
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"rush[ing] to file in Idaho," the California court stated that it was not persuaded by the argument
because "the Salvadors filed their Cross-Application in response to OSS 's Application." (Id.
(emphasis in original).)
12.

After the California Action was stayed, the Idaho district court granted the
Salvadors' Cross Petition, requiring all parties to arbitrate all disputes in a
consolidated Idaho arbitration.

On February 24, 2020, the Idaho district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
granting the Salvadors' Cross Petition. (R. 866-85.) There are three important holdings in the
Idaho court's decision. First, the district court denied the Investors' motion to stay the Idaho
Action. (R. 869-70.) The district court noted that it acquired jurisdiction before the California
court, and the "real parties in interest are the same in both cases and the claims between them are
similar." (R. 870.) Further, the district court reasoned that it was capable of deciding the whole
controversy between the parties by requiring a consolidated Idaho arbitration, which would
"fulfill the objectives of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to litigants, obtaining
prompt and orderly disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent
judgments." (R. 870.)
Second, with regard to the disputes arising from the Employment Agreements, the court
acknowledged that Idaho law governed the Employment Agreements and held that Idaho Code
Section 29-110(1) rendered the California forum selection clauses unenforceable as against
Idaho's strong public policy. (R. 871-74.) Accordingly, the court held that the claims arising
from the Employment Agreements must be arbitrated in Idaho. (R. 871-74.)
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Third, with regard to the disputes arising from the MIP A and LLC Agreement, the court
acknowledged that California law governed. (R. 874-82.) Accordingly, the court examined how
California law treats the enforceability of forum selection clauses. (R. 878-81.) The court
concluded that it was clear that California law "look[ s] at the public policies of the forum where
the action was filed to decide whether arbitration forum selection clauses should be enforced."
(R. 880.) Because this case was filed in Idaho, the court looked to Idaho's public policy and

concluded that Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) rendered the forum selection clauses
unenforceable, and the disputes arising from the MIP A and LLC Agreement must be arbitrated
in Idaho. (R. 881-82.) In reaching this conclusion the district court relied heavily upon this
Court's decisions in T3 and Cerami-Kate, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., "Cerami-Kote." (R. 87582); T3 Enters., Inc. v. Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc., 164 Idaho 738, 435 P.3d 518 (2019); CeramiKote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989). For ease of reference,

copies of T3 and Cerami-Kate are attached hereto.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the district court erred in requiring the parties to arbitrate all
disputes in a consolidated Idaho arbitration.

2.

Whether the Salvadors are entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the district court applies
the same standard as if ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Wattenbarger
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010). As
a result, "[ a]rbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court." Id. at
315,246 P.3d at 968 (quoting Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho
197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 (2007)). This Court "exercise[s] free review over
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questions of arbitrability and may draw [its] own conclusions from the evidence
presented." Id.
T3, 164 Idaho at 741-42, 435 P.3d at 524-25.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Forum Selection Clauses Are Unenforceable as a Matter of Law.

The Investors concede that the California forum selection clauses in the Employment
Agreements should not be enforced due to Idaho Code Section 29-110(1), yet the Investors
paradoxically argue that the nearly identical forum selection clauses in the MIPA and the LLC
Agreement should be enforced, despite Idaho Code Section 29-110(1). The Investors cannot
have it both ways. Either the forum selection clauses are enforceable in all three agreements, or
unenforceable in all three agreements. The Investors attempt to justify their inconsistent position
by claiming that Idaho law does not govern the MIP A and LLC Agreement, thus, Idaho law and
Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) do not apply. This argument is contradicted by the United States
Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and California
courts, all of which hold that, in determining whether to enforce a forum selection clause, the
public policy of the forum state (here, Idaho) must be considered.
1.

Cerami-Kole and T3 illustrate a three-step framework for this analysis.

To determine whether the forum selection clauses are enforceable, this Court should
apply the three-step framework illustrated by Cerami-Kote and T3.
1.

What jurisdiction's law governs the agreements? Here, California law
governs the MIPA and the LLC Agreement.
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11.

How does California law determine the enforceability of a forum selection
clause? California law looks to the public policy of the forum state (here,
Idaho).

111.

If California law considers the public policy of the forum (Idaho), does the
forum (Idaho) have a strong public policy regarding the enforcement of
the forum selection clauses? Yes, Idaho Code Section 29-110( 1) expresses
a strong public policy against the enforcement of forum selection clauses
requiring arbitration outside of Idaho.

The analysis in Cerami-Kote followed this three-step approach. 116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d
1143 (1989). Cerami-Kote addressed a contract governed by Florida law that required disputes to
be filed in Florida. Id. at 57, 773 P.2d at 1144. The plaintiffs filed suit in Idaho, and the Idaho
district court refused to enforce the Florida forum selection clause. Id. at 58, 773 P.2d at 1145.
This Court affirmed the decision, and its analysis followed the three-step framework.
First, this Court noted that Florida law governed the contract. Id. at 57, 773 P.2d at 1144.
Second, this Court analyzed how Florida law treats the enforceability of forum selection clauses.
Id. at 58-59, 773 P.2d at 1145-56. This Court observed that Florida followed the seminal forum

selection clause case, MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., wherein the United States Supreme
Court held that forum selection clauses are generally enforceable unless they are unreasonable.
MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("Bremen"). The United States

Supreme Court specified that a forum selection clause is unreasonable and unenforceable if, inter
alia, "enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is

brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision." Id. at 15. (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the answer to the second step of the framework was: Florida law would not enforce
a forum selection clause if doing so would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
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which the case was brought. Cerami-Kate, 116 Idaho at 59, 773 P.2d at 1146. Third, this Court
analyzed whether the forum (Idaho) has a strong public policy against the enforcement of the
Florida forum selection clauses. Id. This Court determined that the "forum selection clause
violate[ d] the public policy expressed in Idaho Code Section 29-11 0," therefore, the Florida
forum selection clause was unenforceable. Id. at 60, 773 P .2d at 1147.
This Court followed the same three-step framework in T3, which involved a contract
designating Dallas, Texas, as the arbitration forum. 164 Idaho 738, 748-751, 435 P.3d 518, 52831 (2019). First, this Court noted that Texas law governed the enforceability of the forum
selection clause. Id. at 749, 435 P.3d at 529. Second, this Court analyzed Texas law and
concluded that Texas adheres to Bremen. Id. That is, under Texas law, forum selection clauses
are generally enforceable unless enforcement "would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum where the suit was brought." Id. (quoting In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228,
231-32 (Tex. 2008)). Third, this Court held that "enforcement of the Dallas forum selection
clause would contravene the strong public policy articulated in Idaho Code Section 29-110(1 ),"
therefore, the forum selection clause was unenforceable. Id. at 751,435 P.3d at 531.
2.

Applying the three-step framework to this case demonstrates that the forum
selection clauses are unenforceable.

Applied to this case, the three-step framework from T3 and Cerami-Kate demonstrates
that the forum selection clauses are unenforceable. First, California law governs the MIP A and
the LLC Agreement. (R. 283, 428.)
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Second, California law, like Florida and Texas law, routinely relies on Bremen when
analyzing the enforceability of a forum selection clause, and, under California law, forum
selection clauses are generally enforced unless doing so would be unreasonable. Cal-State Bus.
Prods. & Servs., Inc. v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1678-80 (1993); Smith, Valentino &
Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 494 (1976); CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat'/
Hockey League Players' Ass 'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1353 (1995); Berg v. MTC Elecs., Tech.,

61 Cal. App. 4th 349, 358 (1998). Crucially, California law does not merely express general
agreement with Bremen; it expressly adopts the key holding from Bremen. That is, under
California law, "a forum selection clause will not be enforced if to do so will bring about a result
contrary to the public policy of the forum." CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat 'l Hockey League
Players' Ass 'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1354 (1995); Cal-State Bus. Prods. & Servs., Inc. v.
Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1680 (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("a court will refuse to

enforce a forum-selection clause if this will bring about a result contrary to the public policy of
the forum.")); Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 13 (2001) ("a forum
selection clause will not be enforced if to do so will bring about a result contrary to the public
policy of the forum").
California's consideration of the forum's public policy is further demonstrated by
unpublished California decisions. See Wollam Int'/ Corp. v. New Era Decorative Fabrics, Inc.,
2007 WL 1866769, * 9 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2007) (a forum selection clause is unreasonable if
enforcement "would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is
brought"); Troisi v. Cannon Equip. Co., 2010 WL 2061989, *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2010)
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("[t]he question is ... whether enforcement of the forum selection agreement would violate the
policy of the other party's state") (quoting Swenson v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d
1101, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 2006)).
This conclusion is further demonstrated by the fact that California law considers the
public policy of the forum in other contract-interpretation cases. Indeed, the Idaho district court
in this case noted that "California appellate courts have a long history of enforcing contract
provisions 'except where they are contrary to a strong public policy of the forum."' (R. 878.) The
district court supported its statement by citing Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, which addressed the
legality of a contract formed in another state. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 48 Cal. App. 2d 12, 22
(1941 ). The California court held that a contract will be enforced in California if it is valid in the
state where the contract was formed, "unless the contract is contrary to a strong public policy of
the forum." Id.; see Engle v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 71, 75 (1956). Similarly,
California law considers the public policy of the forum when analyzing contractual conflict-oflaw issues. See Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 20 (1964) (the "[s]trong
public policy of the forum, which always has been a consideration, is surely no less regarded
now"). California courts made similar observations when analyzing contractual choice-of-law
provisions. See Menco Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 440 (1987);

see also Lidow v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 351, 362 (2012) (citing Rest. 2d Conf. of
Laws, § 6, com. 1, subd. (2)(b ), p. 11) ("under general choice-of-law principles, one factor to
consider is the relevant public policies of the forum state").
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Notably, the Investors concede that the district court's decision should be affirmed "if
California mirror[s] Florida and Texas law." (Appellants' Br. 20). This is a surprising
concession, especially because, as explained above, California law does mirror Florida and
Texas law in every meaningful way. In sum, California law provides an unambiguous answer to
the second step of the framework: under California law, a forum selection clause will generally
be enforced, unless doing so would contravene a strong public policy in the forum where the
case is brought.
The third step of the framework asks whether enforcing the California forum selection
clauses in the MIPA and LLC Agreement would violate a strong public policy of the forum, i.e.,
Idaho. This analysis is simple because "Idaho has a strong public policy against forum selection
clauses as evidenced in Idaho Code section 29-110(1)." T3, 164 Idaho 738, 750, 435 P.3d 518,
530 (2019); Cerami-Kate, 116 Idaho 56, 59, 773 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1989). The forum selection
clauses in the MIP A and the LLC Agreement are precisely the types of forum selection clauses
that Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) was designed to invalidate. Indeed, both the MIPA and the
LLC Agreement purport to restrict the Salvadors from arbitrating in Idaho. (R. 283, 428.)
Because enforcement of the California forum selection clauses would contravene the strong
public policy articulated in Idaho Code Section 29-110(1 ), the forum selection clauses are
unenforceable under California law. T3, 164 Idaho at 750, 435 P.3d at 530; Cerami-Kate, 116
Idaho at 59, 773 P.2d at 1146.
While the T3 and Cerami-Kate decisions could be read narrowly to apply only to Texas
and Florida law, a recent decision from the Ninth Circuit confirms the ongoing validity of cases
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from jurisdictions that rely on Bremen by invalidating forum selection clauses that require
arbitration to occur outside of Idaho. See Gemini Tech., Inc. v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 931 F .3d
911 (2019). In Gemini, the district court enforced a Delaware forum selection clause, but it did
not consider "Idaho Code§ 29-110(1) or engage in a Bremen public policy analysis." Id. at 915.
The district court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court had overruled Bremen, and thus
Bremen's rationale (that the public policy of the forum court was an important factor to consider

regarding the enforceability of a forum selection clause) no longer applied. Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. The Ninth Circuit emphasized
that Bremen was good law, and it held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider the public policy of the forum. Id. Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the Delaware
forum selection clause was unenforceable because enforcement would contravene Idaho Code
Section 29-110(1). Id. at 916. Given that there can be little doubt that California law also follows
Bremen, and that this Court must apply Idaho Code Section 29-110(1 ), Gemini strongly supports

the district court's decision. The Salvadors respectfully request that this Court affirm the district
court's decision, holding that all three forum selection clauses are unenforceable and requiring
all parties to arbitrate their claims in a consolidated Idaho arbitration.
B.

The Investors' Arguments Are Contrary to Fact and Law.
1.

The Investors rely on a misstatement of California law in arguing that
California law follows a narrow version of Bremen.

The Investors erroneously argue that California follows Bremen for the limited purpose
of recognizing "the modem trend favoring the enforceability of forum selection clauses," and
California does not follow Bremen for the proposition that a forum selection clause will not be
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enforced if doing so would contravene the public policy of the forum. (Appellants' Br. 20-22.)
The Investors rely on Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court as purported support that
California follows a narrow version of Bremen. (Appellants' Br. 21-22, citing Smith, 17 Cal. 3d
491, 551 P.2d 1206 (1976).) The Investors' argument fails because the Smith court recognized
that the public policy of the forum may render a forum selection clause unenforceable. Smith, 17
Cal. 3d 491, 495-96, 551 P.2d 1206, 1209 (1976). In Smith, California was the forum, therefore,
the court considered California's public policy. Id. ("No satisfying reason of public policy has
been suggested why enforcement should be denied of a forum selection clause .... "). Here,
Idaho is the forum, therefore, California law would consider Idaho's public policy.
The Investors' argument also fails because it ignores California cases that expressly
recognize that a forum selection clause will not be enforced if doing so would contravene a
public policy of the forum. See Cal-State Bus. Prods. & Servs., Inc. v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th
1666, 1680 (1993) ("a court will refuse to enforce a forum-selection clause if this will bring
about a result contrary to the public policy of the forum") (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972)); CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat 'l Hockey League Players' Ass 'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th
134 7, 13 54 ( 1995) ("a forum selection clause will not be enforced if to do so will bring about a
result contrary to the public policy of the forum").
Even if the Investors are correct Bremen -

that California law adopts a narrow version of

their argument would still fail because California law considered the public policy of

the forum before Bremen. See Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 48 Cal. App. 2d 12, 22 (1941); Engle v.
Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 71, 75 (1956); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal.
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App. 2d 11, 20 (1964) (the "[s]trong public policy of the forum, which always has been a
consideration, is surely no less regarded now").
2.

The Investors rely upon a misstatement of California law regarding the
factors that may render a forum selection clause unenforceable.

The Investors rely on a misstatement of California law by arguing that a forum selection
clause is unreasonable, and thus unenforceable, in only two circumstances: (1) if enforcement
would diminish a party's substantive rights under California law; or (2) if enforcement would
violate a strong California public policy. (Appellants' Br. at 14-19.) Specifically, the Investors
assert that "a forum selection clause does not stand or fall under California law based on the
public policy of the place where a suit might be filed .... Instead it turns solely on California's
public policy and the substantive rights secured to California residents." (Appellants' Br. 19.)
The Investors' argument is contrary to the plain language of California case law, holding
that a forum selection clause is unreasonable and unenforceable if enforcement would contravene
the public policy of the forum where the case is brought. See Cal-State Bus. Prods. & Servs., Inc.
v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1680 (1993) ("a court will refuse to enforce a forum-selection

clause if this will bring about a result contrary to the public policy of the forum") (citing Bremen,
407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)); CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat'! Hockey League Players' Ass 'n, 39
Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1354 (1995) ("a forum selection clause will not be enforced if to do so will
bring about a result contrary to the public policy of the forum").
The Investors attempt to support their position by discussing five California cases.
(Appellants' Br. 15-19.) These cases support the Salvadors, not the Investors. Each of the five
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cases recognize that a forum selection clause is unreasonable and unenforceable if, inter alia,
enforcement would violate the public policy of the forum where the case is brought. For
instance, in Hall v. Superior Court, a California court acknowledged that a forum selection
clause may be unenforceable due to a "satisfying reason of public policy" or if enforcement
would '"result in an evasion of . . . a statute of the forum protecting its citizens."' Hall v.
Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411, 417 (1983) (emphasis added) (citing and quoting Smith,
Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206 (1976), and Frame v.
Merrill Lynch et al., 20 Cal. App. 3d 688 (1971)). Similarly, in America Online, Inc. v. Superior
Court, a California court reviewed California precedent, stating that "a forum selection clause

will not be enforced if to do so will bring about a result contrary to the public policy of the
forum." 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 13 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting CQL Original Prods., Inc. v.
Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass 'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1353 (1995)). In Intershop Comm.
v. Superior Court, the California court cited approvingly of Bremen and CQL, both of which

consider the public policy of the forum. Inters hop Comm. v. Superior Court, l 04 Cal. App. 4th
191 (2002). In short, the California cases discussed by the Investors demonstrate that, like
Florida and Texas law, California law considers the public policy of the forum.
Additionally, and arguing in the alternative, even if the Investors are correct (that the
enforceability of a forum selection clause turns on whether a party's substantive rights under
California law are diminished), the Investors' argument still fails. Indeed, a California court
indicated that the diminishment of a party's substantive rights under California law is not a
concern if the parties stipulate to apply California law. Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., 237 Cal.
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App. 4th 141, 157-58 (2015). The Salvadors agree that California law applies to the arbitration
of the LLC Agreement and the MIPA. (R. 283, 428.) Therefore, the diminishment of substantive
rights under California law is not at issue.
Further, and continuing to argue in the alternative, even if this Court agrees with the
Investors (that only California public policy, and not Idaho public policy, should be considered)
the forum selection clauses are still unenforceable because California disfavors piecemeal
litigation that risks inconsistent rulings or results. Splitting this matter into two arbitrations
would contradict the policy articulated in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2(c),
which provides that a California court should not enforce an arbitration agreement if a "party to
the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a
third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a
possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
1281.2(c).
Here, California's policy of avoiding conflicting arbitration results would be contravened
if the forum selection clauses of the MIP A and LLC Agreement are enforced. Indeed, allowing
the dispute to be split into two parallel arbitrations would create a substantial risk that the
arbitrations could reach conflicting results because the entire dispute arises out of the same
transaction and the parties assert similar claims. (R. 870.) If the arbitrations are divided into two
separate proceedings, there is a risk that the respective arbitrators would reach conflicting rulings
on those claims.
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3.

The Investors mischaracterize
abandonment of California law.

the

district

court's

analysis

as

an

The Investors argue that the district court "abandoned California law" in favor of
applying Cerami-Kate and T3. (Appellants' Br. 20.) In other words, the Investors argue that the
district court should have ignored Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) and looked only to California's
public policy to determine whether the forum selection clauses are enforceable. To support their
argument, the Investors emphasize that the district court did not cite a California case in which a
California court considered another state's public policy. (Appellants' Br. 20.) The Investors'
argument is flawed for three reasons.
First, as discussed above, the Investors' argument is contrary to the plain language of
California case law, which expressly recognizes that a forum selection clause will not be
enforced if doing so would contravene a public policy of the forum. See Cal-State Bus. Prods. &
Servs., Inc. v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1680 (1993); CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat'l
Hockey League Players' Ass 'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1354 (1995).

Second, the Investors' argument fails because a similar argument was raised and rejected
in T3. In T3, the appellants argued that the parties chose Texas law to govern the agreement,
therefore "the rest of Idaho law [namely, Section 29-11 0] no longer applies." T3, 164 Idaho 73 8,
750, 435 P.3d 518, 530 (2019). This Court rejected that argument, explaining that the "parties'
selection of Texas law is precisely why Section 29-110(1) was considered by the district court."
Id. This Court summarized the analysis as follows:

Texas law considers the public policy of the forum where suit is brought to
determine if a forum selection clause is enforceable. Here, T3 brought suit in
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Idaho. The district court, applying Texas law, cited to Idaho Code section 29110(1) as evidence of the public policy in Idaho-the forum where suit was
brought-disfavoring forum selection clauses. The district court did not ignore
the selection of Texas law, and in fact applied Texas law in determining whether
the forum selection clause was enforceable.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The district court correctly followed this Court's mandate in this

case. The district court correctly concluded that California law considers the public policy of the
forum, and, applying California law, the district court cited to Section 29-110(1) as evidence of
the public policy of the forum (Idaho) disfavoring forum selection clauses. (R. 87 4-82.)
Therefore, contrary to the Investors' argument, the district court did not "abandon California
law." (R. 874-82.) Rather, the district court followed this court's binding precedent.
Third, the Investors' argument is flawed because it ignores the subtle but significant
difference between asking: (a) whether a California court has considered the public policy of
another forum; and (b) whether California law considers the public policy of another forum. The
Investors incorrectly focus on the former. Specifically, the Investors emphasize that the
Salvadors and the Idaho district court "were unable to cite any case in which a California court
actually considered another state's policy." (Appellants' Br. 20 (emphasis added).) This
argument ignores the obvious fact that in California cases the forum is California. This rather
pedestrian point merely means that, because the forum in California cases is California,
California courts consider California public policy. The proper inquiry is whether California law
considers the public policy of the forum. The answer is clearly yes. See Cal-State Bus. Prods. &
Servs., Inc. v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1680 (1993); CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat'l
Hockey League Players' Ass 'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1354 (1995).
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If the Investors' argument had merit, then it stands to reason that Cerami-Kate and T3

would include citations to Florida and Texas cases expressly applying another state's public
policy. That is not the case. In Cerami-Kate and T3, this Court concluded that, under Florida and
Texas law, a forum selection clause will not be enforced if enforcement would contravene the
public policy of the forum. Cerami-Kate, 116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989); T3, 164 Idaho
738, 749, 435 P.2d 518, 529 (2019). This Court reached the conclusion based on two Florida
cases and two Texas cases, none of which applied another state's public policy. Cerami-Kate,
116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989); T3, 164 Idaho 738, 749, 435 P.2d 518, 529 (2019).
Therefore, this Court should disregard the Investors' emphasis on the absence of a California
case applying another state's public policy, and instead rule according to the plain language of
California law, which expressly recognizes that a forum selection clause will not be enforced if
doing so would contravene a public policy of the forum. See Cal-State Bus. Prods. & Servs., Inc.
v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1680 (1993); CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. Nat'/ Hockey League
Players' Ass'n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1354 (1995).

4.

The Investors ignore T3, Cerami-Kote, and Gemini in arguing that Idaho
Code Section 29-110(1) is not a sufficiently strong public policy.

The Investors argue that Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) is not a sufficiently strong public
policy as to invalidate the forum selection clauses. (Appellants' Br. 24-26.) The Investors
attempt to support their argument with Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11
(1964). In Ury, a California resident asked a California court to declare that a loan agreement
governed by New York law was unenforceable because the loan's usurious interest rate violated
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California public policy. Id. at 18. The California resident argued that California's constitutional
prohibition on usury constituted a sufficiently strong public policy. Id. at 20. The court
acknowledged that a "[ s]trong public policy of the forum" has always been a consideration, but it
concluded that California's general prohibition on usury was not sufficiently strong to invalidate
the loan. Id. The court emphasized that although California generally prohibited usury, numerous
exceptions exist. Id. For example, banks, industrial loan companies, credit unions, and several
other kinds oflenders are exempted from California's general prohibition on usury. Id. In light of
these exemptions, California's general prohibition on usury did not constitute a "strong public
policy." Id. The Investors liken Idaho Code Section 29-110(1) to California's general prohibition
on usury, and the Investors argue that neither constitutes a "strong public policy."
As a preliminary matter, this argument implicitly concedes that California law requires
the consideration of Idaho public policy, which blatantly contradicts with the Investors'
argument that California never considers another state's public policy. In any event, the
Investors' attempt to liken California's general prohibition on usury to Idaho Code Section 29110(1) is unpersuasive. Unlike California's general prohibition on usury, Section 29-110(1) does
not contain numerous exemptions. LC. § 29-110(1). Moreover, T3, Cerami-Kate, and Gemini
clearly hold that Section 29-110(1) constitutes a "strong public policy" of Idaho. T3, 164 Idaho
738, 750, 435 P.3d 518, 530 (2019); Cerami-Kate, 116 Idaho 56, 60, 773 P.2d 1143, 1147
(1989); Gemini, 931 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2019). For these reasons, this Court should reject the
Investors' argument.
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5.

In an attempt to support their false narrative, the Investors rely on a cherrypicked excerpt from the Idaho transcript and an inaccurate summary of the
California proceeding.

According to the Investors, the Salvadors want an Idaho court to decide this matter in
order to bring about "a misapplication of California law." (Appellants' Br. 28.) This could not be
further from the truth. The Salvadors never intended for any court, let alone an Idaho court, to be
involved. When the parties' dispute first arose in May 2019, the Salvadors sought to resolve all
claims through negotiation. (R. 54-57, 588.) After the Investors refused to negotiate, the
Salvadors suggested a consolidated California arbitration. (R. 864.) The Investors derailed the
arbitration process -

and created a procedural quagmire -

by filing parallel applications for

arbitration, first in Idaho, then in California. (R. 8-19, 746, 863, 867.) Having created this
procedural mess, the Investors now disingenuously blame the Salvadors.
Even the California court saw through the Investors' hypocrisy. At the California hearing,
the Investors argued that the Salvadors acted in bad faith by rushing to Idaho in order to avoid
California law. (R. 826-27, 862-65.) The California court rejected the Investors' argument,
stating:
The Court is not persuaded by Petitioners' argument . . . . Nor is the Court
convinced that the Salvadors' actions demonstrate bad faith, especially since the
Salvadors were willing to have all claims (involving both OSS and Petitioners)
heard in one forum (either California or Idaho), yet OSS file[ d] its application in
Idaho.
(R. 864.) If, the Salvadors were truly seeking "a misapplication of California law," it stands to
reason that the California court would have stepped in to prevent the same.
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In an attempt to support the false narrative that the Salvadors seek a "misapplication of
California law," the Investors cherry-pick an excerpt from the Idaho transcript. (Appellants'
Br. 28-29.) The cherry-picked excerpt is as follows:
Court:

[W]hy should I not wait and see what a California court does and
how they would look at Idaho Code 29-11 0?
[1] It's awfully tempting. Why should I not do it?

Mr. Bolinger: First of all, the California court isn't going to pay much attention
to the T3 versus Safeguard case.
(Appellants' Br. 29 (quoting Tr. Vol. 1, p. 14, 41:25--42:14).) Based on this short excerpt, the
Investors falsely assert that the Salvadors "tacitly conceded that a California court, applying
California law, would not look at Idaho's law or public policy." (Appellants' Br. 29.)
Unsurprisingly, the Investors ignore Mr. Bolinger's (the Salvadors' counsel) explanation, which
provides important context and undermines the Investors' argument.
The Salvadors' counsel explained that a threshold issue was whether California or Idaho
obtained jurisdiction first and thereby became the forum. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 14, 43:19-21.) Here,
Idaho obtained jurisdiction first because OSS provoked the fight by initiating the Idaho Action
first. (R. 8-19.) Consequently, under California law, the public policy of the forum (Idaho) must
be considered, and Section 29-110(1) is dispositive. For the sake of argument, the Salvadors'
counsel acknowledged that if the parties filed in California first (they did not), California would
be the forum, and the "public policy of the forum" analysis would focus on California's public
policy, not Section 29-110(1) or T3. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 15, 45:24 - 46:6.) This context explains that
the alleged "tacit concession" is only relevant if California was the forum, but that is not the
case.
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The Investors also attempt to support their argument by inaccurately paraphrasing the
California hearing. (Appellants' Br. 29.) Specifically, the Investors ascribe significance to the
fact that the California court was willing to grant the Investors' California Petition, but for the
Salvadors' motion to stay. (Appellants' Br. 29.) This argument should be disregarded as
irrelevant. Indeed, it is akin to arguing that default judgment should be granted because, but for a
defendant filing an answer, a plaintiff would be entitled to default. It simply makes no sense.
Further, the Investors suggest that the California court "attempted to elicit an explanation from
the Salvadors as to why the California Petition should be denied, if not for the stay [and the]
Salvadors did not provide an explanation." (Appellants' Br. 29.) The Investors misstate the
record. The Investors purport to paraphrase two pages of the California transcript, found on
pages 838 and 839 in the Record, but those pages do not align with the Investors' paraphrasing,
nor do any other pages of the California transcript. Therefore, this Court should disregard the
Investors' argument.

6.

The Investors' "first-to-file" arguments are meritless.

The Investors argue that the district court's ruling creates an arbitrary "first-to-file"
standard, resulting in "the forum selection provision [being] valid if [the Investors] reach a
California courthouse's steps first," and the forum selection clauses being "invalid if, as
happened here, the Salvadors reach an Idaho court first." (Appellants' Br. 27.)
This argument is contrary to fact because the Salvadors did not rush to Idaho court first;
rather, the Investors (through OS S) initiated the Idaho Action first. (R. 8-19.) The Investors
raised a similar argument to the California court, and the California court rejected it out of hand,
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stating: "Nor is the Court persuaded that the Salvadors 'rushed to file in Idaho,' as Petitioners
suggest. Again, the Salvadors filed their Cross-Application in response to OSS' [Idaho]
Application." (R. 864 (emphasis in original).)
The Investors raise several related arguments that are without merit, three of which are
worth noting. First, the Investors argue that a first-to-file standard "encourages proliferation of
litigation, rather than negotiated resolution." (Appellants' Br. 27.) This argument is hypocrisy in
the purest form. The record clearly demonstrates that the Investors proliferated litigation by
filing parallel lawsuits in Idaho and California to fight about procedural issues, instead of
accepting the Salvadors' offer to address the merits of the dispute through a negotiated
settlement or a consolidated arbitration. (R. 8-19, 746-53, 863, 867.)
The Investors' argument is also disingenuous because the record clearly demonstrates
that the Investors are not interested in a negotiated resolution. The Investors refused to negotiate
with the Salvadors when the claims first arose in May 2019, and the Investors rejected the
Salvadors' subsequent offers to negotiate. (R. 54-57, 583-85, 587-89.) Specifically, in
December 2019, the Salvadors' counsel e-mailed a five-and-one-half page, single-spaced letter
to the Investors' counsel, which reiterated the Salvadors' suggestion of a global settlement, set
forth suggested settlement terms, and provided a detailed analysis of the parties' claims. (R. 70204.) The letter asked that the Investors respond within one week, but noted that additional time

could be provided. (Id.) Instead of making a counter-offer, or even taking the weekend to
consider the Salvadors' thorough letter, the Investors' counsel responded approximately three
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hours after receiving the letter. (Id.) The Investors' counsel's terse, one-paragraph response, read
as follows, in pertinent part:
Our clients reject the "Settlement Demand" and completely disagree with your
factual and legal suppositions. Your suppositions are so untethered to reality that
there is no reason to waste time responding further.
(Id.) This response is consistent with the Investors' bad-faith approach to this litigation, and it
confirms the Salvadors' suspicion that the Investors intend to make this litigation as expensive as
possible in an attempt to outspend the Salvadors and force them to concede. The Investors have
not denied that this is their goal. (R. 576, 686, 772.) The Salvadors' suspicion is further
confirmed by the Investors' decision to file this appeal.
Second, the Investors argue that a "first-to-file" standard incentivizes forum shopping.
(Appellants' Br. 27.) Presumably, the Investors believe that the Salvadors forum-shopped by
filing a Cross Petition in Idaho. This argument is flawed because the Salvadors were the second
party to file in both the Idaho Action and the California Action. See Berg v. MTC Elecs. Tech.,
61 Cal. App. 4th 349, 357 n.5 (1998) ("Normally a defendant cannot affect the choice of
forum.").
Third, the Investors argue that a "first-to-file" standard disrupts the reasonable
expectations of contracting parties. (Appellants' Br. 27-28.) This argument is disingenuous
because all three agreements contain California forum selection clauses, thus, the Salvadors
reasonably expected that all disputes would be resolved in a single forum. (R. 283, 428, 448--49,
459-60.) Based on the language of the agreements, there was no possibility of parallel
arbitrations in two separate forums. Despite the nearly identical forum selection clauses, the
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Investors sought enforcement of only two forum selection clauses. It is the Investors, not the
Salvadors, who are seeking to disrupt the reasonable expectations of the parties.
C.

A Consolidated Arbitration Is Consistent With Practical and Equitable Factors and
Avoids the Substantial Risk of Contradictory Findings or Awards.
1.

A consolidated arbitration is consistent with practical and equitable factors.

This Court may also invoke equitable jurisdiction to prevent the hardship that would
result from a blind application of the MIPA and LLC Agreement's forum selection clauses.
Lunnenborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018). Specifically, this

Court may exercise and apply "principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to
particular circumstances, including the judicial prevention of hardship that would otherwise
ensue from the literal interpretation of a fair-minded application of a trial court's discretion." Id.
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 656 (10th ed. 2014)).
The blind application of the MIP A and LLC Agreement's forum selection clauses would
require parallel arbitrations and cause three unnecessary hardships. First, parallel arbitrations
would require both parties to unnecessarily waste additional time and money and would
contravene the very purpose of arbitration, which is to obtain a resolution that is "expedient,
efficient and cost-effective." Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 129, 145
(2014) (quoting Burton v. Cruise, 190 Cal. App. 4th 939, 948 (2010); see Bingham Cnty.
Comm 'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 41, 665 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1983) ("Arbitration is

favored in that it allows parties to settle their disputes without expending time and unnecessary
expense on needless litigation.").
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Second, parallel arbitrations would result in the piecemeal resolution of the claims, which
is disfavored by both California and Idaho, and precluded by principles of res judicata. Losser v.
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 674, 183 P.3d 758, 762 (2008) ("This Court has emphasized the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation."); Cook v. Superior Court ofLos Angeles Cnty., 243
Cal. App. 2d 622, 624 (1966) (piecemeal litigation should be avoided, especially when two
actions are interrelated and "could be more efficiently and effectively tried in a single
proceeding"); Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 897 (2002) (res judicata
promotes judicial economy and precludes piecemeal litigation). This Court has taken an
especially aggressive approach to avoid piecemeal litigation, stating: "Where deliberate efforts to
cause piecemeal litigation are established, there is an abuse of process that courts need not
tolerate." Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 595, 635 P.2d 955, 959 (1981) (quoting American
Bar Association Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies § 6.1) (overruled on other
grounds by Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2013)).
Third, allowing parallel arbitrations would undermine the very purpose of contractual
forum selection clauses, which is to provide certainty and predictability as to where a dispute
will be arbitrated. Kosterman v. Choice Hotels Int'!, Inc., 2005 WL 1177947, *4 (D. Idaho
May 18, 2005); Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 583, 588 (2003). Here, all
three agreements contain California forum selection clauses, thus, the Salvadors were provided
certainty and predictability that all disputes would be resolved in a single forum. (R. 283, 428,
448--49, 459-60.) There was no possibility of parallel arbitrations in two separate forums based
on the language of those clauses.
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The Salvadors have consistently taken the position that all claims should be resolved in a
single consolidated arbitration, whether in Idaho or California. (R. 567-68, 864.) At the outset of
this dispute, the Salvadors offered to consolidate the arbitrations in a single California
arbitration, but the Investors refused. (R. 184, 864.) Unfortunately, in an attempt to bully the
Salvadors into wasting time and money, the Investors unreasonably refused to consolidate the
arbitrations. This Court should not condone the Investors' tactics.

2.

A consolidated arbitration avoids the substantial risk of inconsistent or
contradictory findings or awards.

This Court should affirm the district court's decision and reqmre the parties to
consolidate the arbitrations to avoid the risk of inconsistent or contradictory factual findings,
legal holdings, or awarded relief. California's policy of avoiding the potential for inconsistent
judgments is articulated in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2(c). Likewise,
Idaho's policy of avoiding the potential for inconsistent judgments is articulated in Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), which permits a court to dismiss an action when there is "another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause." Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437,
439--41, 988 P.2d 211, 213-15 (1999). A corollary of Rule 12(b)(8) is that a court "may direct
the parties in an existing case to litigate a claim in that case rather than litigating it in another,
separate action." Knight Ins. Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 60 (Ct. App. 1985). The power to
order parties to consolidate claims into one action is "guided by the same criteria that govern a
decision to refrain when a separate action already is pending -

i.e., the identity of the real

parties in interest, the degree to which the claims are similar, and 'the occasionally competing
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objectives of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to the litigants, obtaining prompt and
orderly disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments.'" Id.
(quoting Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1984)).
Here, parallel arbitrations would create the potential for inconsistent judgments because
there is significant overlap in the parties and the claims. For instance, both arbitrations would
involve the same individuals: the Salvadors, and Jose Blanco, who manages TI, OSS, and is the
agent of CVF. (R. 8-19, 193-218, 746-53.) Additionally, there is significant overlap in the
parties' claims because all claims arise from the same transaction (the Sale), and the Investors
(through OSS, TI, and CVF) assert similar, and in at least one case identical, claims. (R. 8-19,
746-53.) The Idaho district court concluded the same, stating that "[t]he real parties in interest
are the same in both cases and the claims between them are similar." (R. 870.) If the arbitrations
are divided into two separate proceedings, there is a substantial risk that the respective arbitrators
could reach inconsistent or contradictory factual findings, legal holdings, or arbitration awards.
To avoid this result, this Court should affirm the district court's order and require the parties to
resolve all claims in a single arbitration.

V.

ATTORNEY FEES

The Salvadors respectfully request costs and attorney fees on appeal in accordance with
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 1), the
parties' agreements, Idaho Code Section 45-615(2), Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), Idaho Code
Section 12-121, and as otherwise allowed by law.
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) provides that a court may award attorney fees to
the prevailing party "when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Here, the
parties' LLC Agreement states that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys'
fees, costs and other expenses" if, inter alia, the services of an attorney are required to address a
breach of the LLC Agreement or to interpret any provision of the LLC Agreement. (R. 426-27.)
The entire attorneys fees provision from the LLC Agreement is set forth below.
19 .11 Attorneys' Fees; Prejudgment Interest. If the services of an attorney are
required by any party to secure the performance of this Agreement or otherwise
upon the breach or default of another party to this Agreement, or if any judicial
remedy or arbitration is necessary to enforce or interpret any provision of this
Agreement or the rights and duties of any Person in relation thereto, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and other expenses, in
addition to any other relief to which such party may be entitled. Any award of
damages following judicial remedy or arbitration as a result of the breach of this
Agreement or any of its provisions shall include an award of prejudgment interest
from the date of the breach at the maximum amount of interest allowed by law.
(R. 426-27.)
The plain language of the LLC Agreement provides for an award for costs and attorney
fees in this circumstance because the Salvadors filed their Cross Petition alleging that the
Investors breached the LLC Agreement and the Salvadors asked the Idaho district court to
interpret the LLC Agreement's forum selection clause. (R. 213-15, 563-81.) Therefore, the
Salvadors respectfully request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54(e)(l) and the LLC
Agreement.
Alternatively, under Idaho law, the Salvadors are entitled to their attorneys fees, should
they prevail on this appeal, because this action arises from a commercial transaction under Idaho
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Code Section 12-120(3), despite the fact that the MIPA is governed by California law. See Ward
v. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366, 370, 913 P.2d 582, 586 (1996). In Ward, which is perhaps the

best evidence that Section 12-120(3) represents a substantial policy of the state of Idaho, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that Section 12-120(3) required an award of attorneys fees to the
prevailing party, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying merits of the case were resolved
under California law pursuant to a contractual choice-of-law provision. Id. The dispute in Ward
arose from a failed application of fertilizer and concerned the scope of a subsequent release
signed by the damaged farmer, Ward. Id. at 368, 913 P.2d at 584. The Idaho district court
entered summary judgment in favor of PureGro on the ground that the release precluded the
farmer's suit. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and awarded Ward his attorneys fees
pursuant to Section 12-120(3). Notably, in its opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the
substantive issue -

the scope of the contractual release - under California law. However, when

it came to the determination of whether Ward was entitled to an award of attorneys fees, the
Idaho Supreme Court applied Section 12-120(3) and awarded fees to Ward as the prevailing
party, notwithstanding the fact that California law governed the substantive merits of the breach
of contract claim. The Idaho Supreme Court expressly held:
LC. § 12-120(3) provides that in any civil action to recover on a contract relating
to a "commercial transaction," the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney fee if the commercial transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. Brower
v. E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990)
. . . . Since Ward brought this action claiming a breach of that contract, a
"commercial transaction" was the gravamen of this lawsuit. Thus, Ward is
entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-
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120(3). E.g., Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d
1365 (1994).
Ward, 128 Idaho at 370, 913 P.2d at 586 (emphasis added).

The holding in Ward is clear and applies with great force to the facts presented here:
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) is a fundamental Idaho policy that applies even in cases where the
substantive merits of the claims are governed by the law of some other jurisdiction. The Idaho
Supreme Court analyzed the substantive merits of the breach of contract claim under California
law, but allowed attorneys fees to the prevailing party pursuant to Section 12-120(3). In short,
when the holding in Ward is viewed in light of the above authorities, it becomes evident that the
Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the award of attorneys fees, pursuant to Section 12120(3), is a fundamental policy of the state of Idaho. Therefore, the Salvadors respectfully
request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 12-120(3).
Alternatively, the Salvadors request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 45-615(2), which provides that a court may award costs and fees in "[a]ny judgment
rendered ... for the plaintiff in a suit filed pursuant to" Idaho's Wage Claim statute. LC. § 45615(2). The Salvadors' claims include an allegation that the Investors violated Idaho's Wage
Claim Act. (R. 211-12). Although the merits of the Salvadors' wage claim have yet to be
reached, the applicable statute uses broad language, stating that attorney fees may be awarded
with "any judgment rendered" for a wage claim plaintiff. LC.§ 45-615(2) (emphasis added.) The
Idaho district court's judgment requiring the parties to submit to a consolidated Idaho arbitration
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qualifies under the plain language of the statute. Therefore, the Salvadors respectfully request an
award of costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-615(2).
Lastly, the Salvadors request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-121, which provides that reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing
party when a court finds that the case "was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." LC. § 12-121. In Clark v. Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A., this Court awarded attorney fees pursuant to Section 12-121 because the appellant
"failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law" and the appellant
failed to even argue that "this Court should overrule the well-established law" governing the
case. 163 Idaho 215, 230, 409 P.3d 795, 810 (2017). Instead, the appellant "continued making
the same unreasonable arguments on appeal that he made to the district court." Id. Similarly here,
the Investors fail to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law that
governs this case (T3, Cerami-Kate, and Section 29-110(1)). Instead, the Investors continue
making the same unreasonably argument on appeal that they made to the district court.
Therefore, the Salvadors respectfully request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 12121.
An award of attorney fees under Section 12-121 is especially appropriate in light of the
Investors' unreasonable litigation tactics. Throughout this entire dispute, the Salvadors remained
consistent, requesting that the parties' claims be resolved in a single, consolidated arbitration.
(R. 864.) Instead of agreeing to an efficient arbitration, the Investors proliferated litigation by
filing parallel lawsuits in Idaho and California to fight about procedural issues. (R. 8-19, 746-
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53, 863, 867.) The Salvadors remain eager to reach the merits of the claims, but the Investors'
evasive and obstructive conduct continues to cause significant delays. By the time a decision is
issued on this appeal, the Investors will likely have caused more than a two year delay.
The Investors' approach to this litigation is generally reminiscent of the tactics employed
in H20 Envtl., Inc. v. Farm Supply Distribs., Inc., 164 Idaho 295, 429 P.3d 183 (2018). In H20,
the respondent's evasive and obstructive litigation tactics resulted in an unnecessary four year
delay. Id. at 301, 429 P.3d at 189. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burdick expressed
concern that "this case is a great example of what is wrong with the judicial system today and
what will lead to its demise in the future." Id. (C.J. Burdick, concurring). This case raises similar
concerns. Instead of proceeding to the merits of the parties' respective claims, the well-funded
Investors created a "procedural morass" in an attempt to bully the Salvadors into wasting time
and money. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 13, 38:16-18.) The Investors' unreasonable litigation tactics should
not be condoned. Therefore, the Salvadors respectfully request an award of attorney fees and
costs under Section 12-121.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Salvadors respectfully request that the Court affirm the district court's decision,
requiring the parties to arbitrate all claims in a consolidated Idaho arbitration. Further, the
Salvadors respectfully request an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal.
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DATED THIS 13th day of October, 2020.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By: Isl Lars E. Lundberg

Lars E. Lundberg
Attorneys for Cross-Claimants/Respondents
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Attachment A
T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., 164 Idaho 738, 435 P.3d 518 (2019)

T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., 164 Idaho 738 (2019)
435 P.3d 518

164 Idaho 738
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, November 2018 Term.
T3 ENTERPRISES, INC., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent,
and
Thurston Enterprises, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Plaintiff,
V.

SAFEGUARD BUSINESS SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellant,
and
Safeguard Acquisitions, Inc., et al., Defendants.
Docket No. 45093
I
Opinion Filed: February 21, 2019
Synopsis
Background: Authorized distributor brought action against company that distributed business forms, supplies,
and services, alleging breach of distributorship agreement, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices.
The parties proceeded to arbitration in Idaho, rather than in Texas, as forum designated by the agreement. The
arbitration panel found for distributor, which subsequently moved to confirm the award. The District Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Ada County, Steven Hippler, J., 2017 WL 2988949, confirmed the award and denied company's
motion to vacate or modify the award. Company appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Burdick, C.J., held that:
[ 1] trial court had jurisdiction to determine enforceability of forum selection clause;
[2] forum selection clause was unenforceable under Texas law;
[3] award was not subject to vacatur under Federal Arbitration Act section governing appointment of arbitrators;
[4] company waived issue of attorney-client privilege as to emails between company and its in-house counsel;
[5] panel did not manifestly disregard the law in awarding damages and attorney fees; but
[6] distributor was not entitled to appellate attorney fees.

Affirmed.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Arbitration Award; Motion to Confirm
Arbitration Award.
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West Headnotes (38)

[1]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Remedies and Proceedings for Enforcement in General

When ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the trial court applies the same standard as if ruling on
a motion for summary judgment.

[2]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Arbitrability of dispute

Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court.

[3]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Scope and standards of review

Supreme Court exercises free review over questions of arbitrability and may draw its own conclusions
from the evidence presented.

[4]

Appeal and Error

Subject-matter jurisdiction

Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question oflaw over which the Supreme Court
exercises free review.

[5]

Alternative Dispute Resolution
Trial

Remedies and Proceedings for Enforcement in General

Admission of evidence in general

Trial courts have broad discretion over the admission of evidence at trial, including determining whether
to grant a motion to compel.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Appeal and Error

Admission or exclusion of evidence in general

A trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence will only be reversed when there has been
a clear abuse of discretion.

[7]

Appeal and Error

Abuse of discretion

When the Supreme Court reviews whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the four-part inquiry is
whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.

[8]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Scope and Standards of Review

W © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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The scope of review for awards made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act parallels the review of
arbitrations governed by Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act.
§ 7-901 et seq.

[9]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. ; Idaho Code Ann.

Scope and Standards of Review

When reviewing a trial court's decision to vacate or modify an award of an arbitration panel, the Supreme
Court employs virtually the same standard ofreview as that of the trial court when ruling on the petition.

[10]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Limitation to statutory grounds

Judicial review of arbitrators' decisions is limited to an examination of the award to discern if any of
the grounds for relief stated in the Federal Arbitration Act exist.

[11]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

Right to Enforcement and Defenses in General

The Federal Arbitration Act places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and
therefore requires courts to enforce them according to their terms.

[12]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § 2.

Validity

Like other contracts, arbitration agreements may be invalidated by generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.

[13]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Remedies and Proceedings for Enforcement in General

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court must order the parties to proceed with arbitration if the making
of the arbitration agreement is not at issue. 9 U.S.C.A. § 4.

[14]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Arbitrability of dispute

A gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question
of arbitrability for a court to decide.

[15]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Arbitrability of dispute

A disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a
particular type of controversy is for the court.

[16]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Conditions precedent to arbitration; procedural arbitrability

Procedural questions related to arbitrability which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition
are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.
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[17]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Existence and validity of agreement

Trial court had jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of a forum selection clause designating Texas
as the location for arbitration in a distributorship agreement between a distribution company and an
authorized distributor of company's business forms, supplies, and services, where parties' agreement did
not contain a clear and unmistakable delegation of authority to determine enforceability to an arbitrator,
and distributor challenged the forum selection clause based on unconscionability.

[18]

Contracts

Agreement as to place of bringing suit; forum selection clauses

Texas courts generally enforce forum selection clauses.

[19]

Contracts

Agreement as to place of bringing suit; forum selection clauses

A forum selection clause will not be enforced under Texas law when the party opposing the forum
selection clause clearly shows enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust.

[20]

Contracts

Agreement as to place of bringing suit; forum selection clauses

Under Texas law, a forum selection clause will not be enforced for being unreasonable and unjust when
enforcement of the forum selection clause would contravene a strong public policy of the forum where
the suit was brought.

[21]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Place of arbitration

Forum selection clause designating Texas as the location for arbitration in a distributorship agreement
between a distribution company and an authorized distributor of company's business forms, supplies, and
services was unenforceable under Texas law, and thus arbitration of distributor's claims against company
for breach of the agreement properly occurred in Idaho; forum selection clauses were unenforceable
under Texas law when enforcement would have contravened a strong public policy of the forum where
suit was brought, and Idaho statute regarding limitations on right to sue under contract or franchise
agreement evinced a strong public policy against forum selection clauses.
29-110(1).

[22]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Idaho Code Ann. §

Limitation to statutory grounds

Arbitration award for authorized distributor was not subject to vacatur under section of Federal
Arbitration Act governing appointment of arbitrators on ground that the arbitration did not take place in
Texas, as specified by distributorship agreement with company that distributed business forms, supplies,
and services; the Act's sections governing vacation and modification were the exclusive grounds for
vacatur and modification, and, even if the appointment section served as a basis for vacatur, the parties'
agreement did not contain a specific provision stating how arbitrators would be chosen. 9 U.S.C.A. §§

5,

[23]

10, 11.

Privileged Communications and Confidentiality

Waiver of privilege
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Company that distributed business forms, supplies, and services waived issue of attorney-client privilege
as to emails between company and its in-house counsel, in authorized distributor's action against
company for breach of distributorship agreement, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices,
where company stipulated to the admission of the emails at an evidentiary hearing that took place as
part of an arbitration proceeding between the parties.

[24]

Trial

Repetition

If the trial court decides to wait and hear the actual foundation laid before determining whether to admit
or exclude evidence, the moving party is required to continue to object as the evidence is presented.

[25]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Consistency and reasonableness; lack of evidence

A court may overturn an arbitrator's decision only when the award simply reflects the arbitrator's own
notions of economic justice rather than drawing its essence from the contract.

[26]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Error of judgment or mistake of law

Arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law in awarding damages to authorized distributor
based on constructive termination, as basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for vacating the award
in distributor's action for breach of distributorship agreement, tortious interference, and deceptive trade
practices against company that distributed business form, supplies, and services; the award was based
alternatively on theories of breach contract, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices, but
company only challenged the award based on constructive termination as analyzed under the breach of
contract theory, panel's citation to state cases outside of Texas did not rise to intentional disregard, and
agreement allowed panel to award any relief it deemed proper.

[27]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4).

Error of judgment or mistake of law

"Manifest disregard," as basis for vacating an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act,
requires something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the
arbitrators to understand and apply the law; there must be some evidence in the record, other than the
result, that the arbitrators were aware of the law and intentionally disregarded it.
(4).

[28]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § lO(a)

Error of judgment or mistake of law

Arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law in terminating distributorship agreement and
awarding future damages to authorized distributor, as basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for vacating
the award in distributor's action for breach of the agreement, tortious interference, and deceptive trade
practices against company that distributed business form, supplies, and services; company failed to carry
its burden of showing that the panel's decision was not arguably construing or applying the parties'
agreement, and the categories of damages were not duplicative.

[29]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4).

Consistency and reasonableness; lack of evidence
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So long as an arbitrator was arguably construing a contract, a court may not correct his mistakes under
section of the Federal Arbitration Act allowing vacation of an award; the potential for those mistakes is

[30]

the price of agreeing to arbitration.

9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4).

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Consistency and reasonableness; lack of evidence

It is the arbitrator's construction of the contract which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's

decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their
interpretation of the contract is different from his.

[31]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Error of judgment or mistake of law

Arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law in awarding lost commissions to authorized
distributor based on gross profits rather than distributor's net commission, as basis under the Federal
Arbitration Act for vacating the award in distributor's action for breach of distributorship agreement,
tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices against company that distributed business form,
supplies, and services; company failed to carry its burden of showing the panel recognized the correct
law and intentionally disregarded it, and the panel accepted the calculations of distributor's expert and
stated it was awarding damages pursuant to Texas law, as required by parties' agreement.
§ 10(a)(4).

[32]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9U.S.C.A.

Error of judgment or mistake of law

Arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law in awarding future lost commissions to authorized
distributor based on the calculations of distributor's expert, as basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for
vacating the award in distributor's action for breach of distributorship agreement, tortious interference,
and deceptive trade practices against company that distributed business form, supplies, and services;
company failed to carry its burden of showing that the panel recognized the correct law and intentionally
disregarded it, and the panel cited to Texas law, as the law designated by the parties' agreement, that
supported its acceptance of the experts calculation oflost future commissions.

[33]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § lO(a)( 4).

Consistency and reasonableness; lack of evidence

It is not enough to show that an arbitration panel committed an error, or even a serious error; because the

parties bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement, an arbitral decision even arguably
construing or applying the contract must stand, regardless of a court's view of its (de )merits.

[34]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Error of judgment or mistake of law

Arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law in awarding doubled attorney fees to authorized
distributor, as basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for vacating the award in distributor's action for
breach of distributorship agreement, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices against company
that distributed business form, supplies, and services; the panel was arguably construing or applying the
agreement, as it referenced its provisions, and there was no evidence that the arbitrators were aware of
the law and intentionally disregarded it, but rather the panel stated that it found the award of attorney
fees authorized by Texas law, as the law designated by the parties' agreement.

9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4).
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[35]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Costs

Authorized distributor was not entitled to an award of appellate attorney fees under Texas law with
respect to its claims for breach of distributorship agreement and deceptive trade practices, in distribution
company's appeal from trial court's confirmation of an arbitration award for distributor; neither the
Federal Arbitration Act nor Texas case law supported such award.

[36]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

Costs

When an arbitration award contains an award of attorney fees, a trial court may not award additional
attorney fees for enforcing or appealing the confirmation of the award.

[37]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Costs

Authorized distributor was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho and Texas statutes
authorizing such fees in frivolous appeals, in distribution company's appeal from trial court's
confirmation of an arbitration award for distributor on its claims for breach of distributorship agreement,
tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices, where company raised novel issues as to the trial
court's jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of a forum selection clause and provided cogent
argument and support. Idaho Code Ann.§ 12-121 ; Tex. R. App. P. 45 .

[38]

Costs

What constitutes frivolous appeal or delay

Fees will generally not be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal to the Supreme Court for arguments
that are based on a good faith legal argument. Idaho Code Ann. § 12-121 .

**522 Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Steven
Hippler, District Judge.
District court order denying motion to vacate and modify, affirmed.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Boise, and Weil, Gotschal & Manges LLP, Dallas, TX, for appellant. Paul
R. Genender argued.
Givens Pursley LLP, Boise and Mulcahy LLP, Irvine, CA, for respondent. James M. Mulcahy argued.

Opinion
BURDICK, Chief Justice.

*743 **523 This action arises out of Ada County and involves a distributorship agreement (the Distributor
Agreement) between Appellant Safeguard Business Systems (SBS) and Respondent T3 Enterprises (T3). In 2006,
T3 entered into the Distributor Agreement with SBS. In 2014, T3 filed suit alleging SBS had breached the
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Distributor Agreement by failing to prevent other SBS distributors from selling to T3's customers and for paying
commissions to the interfering distributors rather than to T3. The Distributor Agreement between SBS and T3
contained an arbitration clause indicating disputes must be resolved in a Dallas, Texas based arbitration procedure.
The Distributor Agreement also contained a forum selection clause indicating that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and Texas law would apply to any disputes between the parties. Pursuant to this agreement, SBS moved the
district court to compel arbitration in Dallas. The district court determined the parties must submit to arbitration,
but that the Dallas forum selection clause was unenforceable, and arbitration was to take place in Idaho. The
Arbitration Panel (the Panel) found for T3 and the district court confirmed the award in the amount of $
4,362,041.95. The district court denied SBS's motion to vacate or modify the award. SBS timely appealed, and
we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
SBS is engaged in the distribution of Safeguard brand products (e.g., checks, envelopes, and business forms)
and services (e.g., W-2 processing and drop shipping) through a nationwide network of distributors. In 2006,
after working eleven years for Roger Thurston, another SBS distributor, Dawn Teply formed T3 and started her
own distributorship with SBS. T3 purchased the exclusive rights to commissions on all sales made to 2,000 of
Thurston's customers. The purchase was approved by SBS which transferred the "Protected Customers" to T3.
Around this same time, on July 28, 2006, T3 entered into the Distributor Agreement with SBS. Pursuant to the
agreement, T3 obtained the rights, services, and SBS support that is given to SBS distributors. This included
customer protection contractual rights and SB S's enforcement of commission protection and commission rotation.
This meant T3 was entitled to all commissions sold to its Protected Customers.
In 2013, Safeguard Acquisitions (a holding company) was funded by SBS's parent company, Deluxe, to acquire
independent non-SBS distributor businesses that operated in the same market as SBS. Following the acquisitions,
SBS operated the acquired businesses until a qualified buyer could be found to purchase the commission rights on
those accounts. Two of the businesses SBS acquired were Form Systems, Inc., (DocuSource) and Idaho Business
Forms (IBF). Both DocuSource and IBF were direct competitors of T3 in the same geographic market in Idaho
and selling a line of products that directly competed with T3 's sale of Safeguard products. Thus, T3 had a high
volume of cross-over clients with DocuSource and IBF.
In 2015, SBS entered into a Distributor Agreement with KMMR, (a staffing company to IBF), giving it customer
protection rights for the same Protected Customers it had given T3 years earlier. This resulted in customer
confusion as to whom they were supposed to order from and pay. SBS's general counsel, Michael Dunlap, was
tasked with managing the conflict resulting from the overlap in Protected Customers. In this role, Dunlap sent
several email communications to various parties. In 2013 and 2014, Teply attempted, unsuccessfully, to get
information from Mr. Dunlap and SBS for T3 about the cross-over accounts.
In August 2014, T3 filed suit in Idaho alleging SBS breached its Distributor Agreement by failing to prevent other
SBS distributors from selling to T3's customers and for paying commissions to the interfering distributors rather
than to T3. The Distributor Agreement contained an arbitration clause stating that:

EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A) [ (ADDRESSING
**524 *744 SBS'S INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES) ], ALL
CONTROVERSIES, DISPUTES OR CLAIMS ARISING BETWEEN US ... AND YOU ...
ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO: (1) THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY PROVISION
THEREOF OR ANY RELATED AGREEMENT; (2) THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE
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PARTIES HERETO; (3) THE VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY RELATED
AGREEMENT, OR ANY PROVISION THEREOF; OR (4) ANY SPECIFICATION,
STANDARD OR OPERATING PROCEDURE RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OR OPERATION OF THE SAFEGUARD BUSINESS SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR
ARBITRATION TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE DALLAS, TEXAS OFFICE OF
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON DEMAND OF EITHER PARTY.
SUCH ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN DALLAS,
TEXAS AND, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT, SHALL
BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THEN CURRENT COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ....

The Distributor Agreement also contained a forum selection clause that stated:

This Agreement shall become effective when executed and accepted by us in Texas. All
matters relating to arbitration will be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act .... Except to
the extent governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, ... or other federal law, this Agreement,
the distributorship and the relationship between you and Safeguard will be governed and
construed under and in accordance with the laws of Texas, except that the provisions
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (and the regulations thereunder) will not
apply unless its jurisdictional requirements are met independently without reference to this
subsection. [ 1 ]

SBS moved to compel arbitration of T3's claims against it in Dallas, Texas. SBS also moved to stay proceedings
pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding. T3 initially conceded it was bound to arbitrate but sought to
sever the forum provision from the arbitration clause. Later, T3 contended the invalid forum selection provision
rendered the entire arbitration clause void. The district court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the
validity of the forum selection clause, that Texas law was applicable, and that under Texas law the forum selection
clause was unenforceable. Thus, the court ordered the parties to arbitrate in Idaho and denied SBS's motion to
stay proceedings. The district court also granted T3's motion to compel the Dunlap emails and ordered SBS to
produce the documents. The Panel found for T3, and in a supplemental award, awarded T3 over$ 4.3 million in
damages which included attorney fees. The district court confirmed the award and denied SBS's motion to vacate
or modify the award. SBS timely appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider T3 's challenge to forum.
2. Whether the district court erred in ordering the parties to arbitrate in Idaho as opposed to Dallas.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in overruling SB S's claims of attorney-client privilege.
4. Whether the district court erred in denying SBS's motion to vacate based on the arbitration panel exceeding
its powers under the FAA.
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5. Whether T3 is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4] "When ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the district court applies the same standard
as if ruling on a motion for summary judgment." **525 Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho
308,317,246 P.3d 961,970 (2010) *745 . As a result, "[a]rbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the
Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200,
court." Id. at 315, 246 P.3d at 968 (quoting
177 P.3d 944, 947 (2007)). This Court "exercise[s] free review over questions of arbitrability and may draw [its]
own conclusions from the evidence presented." Id. "Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction is
a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." HFL.P., LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho
672, 678, 339 P.3d 557, 563 (2014) .

[5]

[6]

[7] "Trial courts have broad discretion over the admission of evidence at trial, including ... determining

whetherornotto grant a motion to compel."

Kirkv. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 700, 116 P.3d27, 30 (2005).

Id. at 701, 116 P.3d at 31 .
"Such decisions will only be reversed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion."
When this Court reviews whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the four-part inquiry is "[ w]hether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its
decision by the exercise ofreason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) .
[8]
[9]
[1 0] "The scope of review for awards made pursuant to the [FAA] ... parallels the review of arbitrations
governed by Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act[.]" Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391,396 n.4, 146 P.3d 657,

662 n.4 (2006); see also
Hecla Min. Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 561 n.3, 617 P.2d 861, 865 n.3
(1980) ("We note that our view of the proper scope of judicial review of commercial arbitrator's awards does not
vary significantly depending upon which act applies."). "When reviewing a district court's decision to vacate or
modify an award of an arbitration panel this Court employs virtually the same standard of review as that of the
district court when ruling on the petition."
Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 814, 118 P.3d 141, 146
(2005). "Judicial review of arbitrators' decisions is 'limited to an examination of the award to discern if any of
the grounds for relief stated in the [FAA] exist. ' " Barbee, 143 Idaho at 396, 146 P.3d at 662 (quoting
Bingham
Cnty. Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 42, 665 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1983)). Pursuant to the FAA, when
a party moves to confirm an arbitration award, a "court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated,
modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title."
other things, "when arbitrators exceeded their powers .... "

9 U.S.C. § 9. This includes, among

9 U.S.C. § lO(a)( 4).

IV. ANALYSIS
A. The district court had jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of the forum selection clause.
SBS moved to compel arbitration of T3's claims against it in Dallas, Texas. T3 challenged the forum selection

clause arguing it was unconscionable and unenforceable under
Idaho Code section 29-110. T3 argued that
whether a forum selection clause is enforceable is a substantive matter for the court to decide, while SBS argued
it is a procedural matter for the arbitrator to decide. The district court determined the matter was substantive
and ordered the parties to arbitrate T3's claims against SBS in accordance with the Distributor Agreement, but
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determined the Dallas forum selection clause was unenforceable and severable. Thus, the court ordered the parties
to arbitrate in Idaho. The initial issue is whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider whether the Dallas
forum selection clause was enforceable. For the reasons discussed below, the district court had jurisdiction to
consider the enforceability of the forum selection clause.
[11]

[13] The FAA applies to arbitrations involving commerce and provides that:

[12]

A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.

*746

**526

9 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, "the FAA places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with

other contracts" and therefore "requires courts to enforce them according to their terms .... "
Rent-A-Ctr.,
W, Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010). And, "[l]ike other contracts,
[arbitration agreements] may be invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
Id. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (quoting
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S . 681,
unconscionability.'"
687, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996)). Pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA, a court must order the parties to
proceed with arbitration if the making of the arbitration agreement is not at issue. 9 U.S.C. § 4.

As both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have said, arbitrability is a question of law for the court
to decide. Wattenbarger, 150 Idaho at 315,246 P.3d at 968;
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 83, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002). However, procedural questions related to arbitrability are not for
the Court to decide, but rather are for an arbitrator to decide.
Storey Const. Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 412,
224 P.3d 468, 479 (2009) (decision on rehearing). Thus, whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider
the enforceability of the Dallas forum selection clause depends on whether the clause presented a "question of
arbitrability", as opposed to a question of procedural arbitrability.

Id.

[14]
[15] The United States Supreme Court has said that "[t]he question whether parties have submitted a
particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the 'question of arbitrability,' is 'an issue for judicial determination unless

the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.'"
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83, 123 S.Ct. 588. Put another
way, "a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a 'question of
arbitrability' for a court to decide."
Id. at 84, 123 S.Ct. 588 (citing
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 943-46, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)). "Similarly, a disagreement about whether an
arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy is for the court."
Id.
[16] However, the Supreme Court has stated that the "question of arbitrability" does not encompass circumstances
Id. " '[P]rocedural
where the parties would "expect that an arbitrator would decide the gateway matter."
questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively not for the judge,
Id. (quoting
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84
but for an arbitrator, to decide."
S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)). The Supreme Court stated, "issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether

WEST
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prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85, 123 S.Ct. 588 (emphasis
arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide."
removed) (quoting Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 6, comment 2). Similarly, this Court has held that "issues
of procedural arbitrability, such as a condition precedent .... " should be decided by arbitrators as opposed to the

court.

Storey Const. Inc., 148 Idaho at 412, 224 P.3d at 479.

[17] First, SBS argues the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Rent-A-Center is dispositive. In that case,
the parties' arbitration agreement provided that the arbitrator had exclusive authority to resolve disputes relating
Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., 561 U.S.
to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement (the "delegation provision").
at 71, 130 S.Ct. 2772. The Supreme Court held that because the respondent had not challenged the "delegation
provision" and rather had challenged the arbitration agreement as a whole, the Court would treat the delegation
Id. at 72, 130 S.Ct.
provision as valid and leave challenges to the validity of the agreement to the arbitrator.
2772. Here, SBS argues that because its arbitration agreement with T3 provides that disputes related to the validity
of the agreement will be submitted to arbitration, and T3 did not challenge that specific portion of the agreement,
Rent-A-Center. This argument is unavailing. In
Rent-A-Center, the
the outcome in this case is the same as in
Supreme Court also stated, the question of arbitrability "may be delegated to *747 **527 the arbitrator, so long
Id. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (emphasis added). In this case, there
as the delegation is clear and unmistakable."
was not a clear and unmistakable delegation based on provisions 2l(B) and 2l(C) in the arbitration agreement.
While 21 (B) provides that disputes related to the validity of the arbitration agreement are to be arbitrated, 21 (C)
provides that "dispute[s] between [T3] and [SBS] arising in connection with, or related to the interpretation of
this agreement or a claimed breach thereof ... will be tried before a court of competent jurisdiction by a judge
sitting without a jury." Because 2l(C) purports to give the court the authority to interpret the agreement, there

is not a "clear and unmistakable" delegation of authority that would lead to the same conclusion as in
A-Center.

Id.

Rent-

2

SBS next cites to several federal court of appeals cases and contends those cases stand for the proposition that
"procedural matters such as forum are for an arbitrator to decide." While some federal circuits have held that
"venue" is a procedural issue for the arbitrator to decide, those cases are distinguishable from this case. For
Richard C. Young & Company v. Leventhal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether
example, in
an arbitration proceeding filed in Boston, the forum mandated by the forum selection clause, could be transferred

to
California, where one party resided. 389 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004). The court stated, "[t]he dispute between the
parties in this case over the location of the arbitration raises not a question of arbitrability but a procedural question
Id. at 4. However, the court expressly limited its holding to
and is therefore for the arbitrator, not the court."
the situation in the present case; that is, whether the arbitration proceeding could be transferred from one state
Id. at 5. Next, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with whether a forum selection clause
to another.
conflicted with a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rule, and addressed an argument that, if the parties were
required to arbitrate, the forum selection provision in the agreement required that arbitration take place in New
UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Virginia Univ. Hasps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 654 (2d Cir. 2011 ). The court
York County.
held that "venue is a procedural issue" to be resolved by arbitrators and the "[ d]istrict [c]ourt lacked jurisdiction

to resolve it."

Id. at 655.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that venue disputes are appropriate for arbitrator, rather than court,
Cent. W Virginia Energy, Inc. v. Bayer Cropscience LP, 645 F.3d 267,274 (4th Cir. 2011). However,
resolution.
in so holding, the Fourth Circuit was addressing a situation where the parties executed two separate arbitration
Id. at 269. Finally, in
Lodge Works, L.P. v. C.F Jordan
agreements, with differing forum selection clauses.
Construction, LLC, the parties had an arbitration clause that mandated arbitration take place in Wichita, Kansas.

506 F. App'x 747, 748 (10th Cir. 2012). The respondent filed a demand for arbitration in Wichita, and the
appellant subsequently filed a demand for arbitration in Texas.

Id. at 750. The respondent sought, and was

Id. The
granted, an injunction by the district court preventing the appellant from arbitrating outside of Wichita.
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the injunction, stating that "venue selection" is for an arbitrator, rather than
Id. at 750-51. However, in
LodgeWorks, the forum selection clause was not challenged
a court, to decide.
based on a *748 **528 contract defense, like unconscionability, as is the case here.

While the foregoing cases deemed venue an issue for the arbitrator, those cases were not dealing with a challenge
to the forum selection clause based on a contract defense like unconscionability. Other courts, including the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, have decided whether a forum selection clause is unenforceable based on contract
defenses like unconscionability. These circuit courts suggest that when a forum selection clause is challenged
based on a contract defense, the issue of forum selection is a substantive issue for the court. For example, in
Nagrampa v. Mai/Coups, Incorporated, the appellant had challenged a forum selection clause in the arbitration

469 F.3d 1257, 1287 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit stated that the "district
agreement as unconscionable.
court properly undertook to decide whether the arbitration provision in the ... agreement is valid and enforceable
within the meaning of FAA

§ 2 .... "

Id. at 1294. However, the court went on to say "the district court erred

Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
by failing to analyze whether there is evidence of procedural unconscionability[.]"
did not state that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the forum selection challenge, and rather stated

the district court should have considered the unconscionability argument.

Id. at 1295.

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has considered whether a forum selection clause contained in an
Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 778 (7th Cir. 2014). The
arbitration agreement was unenforceable.
court stated, "[l]ike other contractual provisions, forum selection clauses-even those designating arbitral fora-

are not immune from the general principle that unconscionable contractual provisions are invalid."
Id. This case
again implies that courts, rather than arbitrators, have jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in arbitration agreements. Lastly, the Supreme Court of Washington has stated, "Washington courts have
regularly decided whether choice of law and forum selection clauses in arbitration clauses are enforceable."
Saleemi v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 176 Wash.2d 368, 292 P.3d 108, 112 (2013).
As the district court noted, the foregoing cases indicate that when a forum selection clause is challenged pursuant
to a contract defense, as is the case here, then the issue is substantive and for the court to decide. This approach is
consistent with Idaho law. In addressing whether a court should compel arbitration, this Court stated, "the court's
scope of review is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its
face is governed by the parties' contract."
P.3d 944, 948 (2007) . Thus, under

Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 201, 177

Mason , the district court needed to ascertain whether SBS was "making

a claim which on its face [was] governed by the parties' contract."
Id. Because SBS was moving to compel
arbitration in Dallas, the district court needed to determine whether that claim was in accord with the parties'
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contract.
Id. And, because T3 challenged the forum selection clause based on unconscionability, the district
court's review of that clause was appropriate.
Here the district court was deciding whether the forum selection clause was enforceable. Such a determination
is distinguishable from procedural arbitrability issues "such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other
conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate" which the Supreme Court has held "are for the arbitrators
to decide."
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85, 123 S.Ct. 588. Rather, the district court's determination was akin to
a determination of "whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause" which raises a " 'question of
arbitrability' for the court to decide."
Id. at 84, 123 S.Ct. 588 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the district court
had jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of the forum selection clause.

B. The district court did not err when it ordered arbitration to occur in Idaho instead of Dallas.
After the district court determined it had jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of the Dallas forum selection
clause, it determined that Texas law applied to the enforceability of the forum selection clause. Applying **529
*749 Texas law, the district court concluded that the forum selection clause was unenforceable and arbitration
would occur in Idaho, not Dallas. In reaching its decision, the district court stated that a Texas court would consider
Idaho's strong public policy against forum selection clauses as evidenced in
Idaho Code section 29-110(1),
and thus not enforce the forum selection clause. Neither party challenges the district court's determination that
Texas law applies to determine the enforceability of the forum selection clause. Rather, SBS contends the district
court erred when it determined that the forum selection clause was unenforceable under Texas law. For the reasons
discussed below, the district court did not err when it determined the forum selection clause was unenforceable
under Texas law.

[18]
[19]
[20] As an initial matter, Texas courts generally enforce forum selection clauses.
In re Lyon Fin.
Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. 2008). However, this general rule is not without exception. One such
exception provides that a forum selection clause will not be enforced when the party opposing the forum selection
clause clearly shows enforcement would be "unreasonable and unjust[.]"

In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109,

112 (Tex. 2004) (quoting
MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513
(1972)). A forum selection clause comes within such exception when "enforcement [of the forum selection clause]
would contravene a strong public policy of the forum where the suit was brought[.]"
Inc., 257 S.W.3d at 231 - 32;

In re Lyon Fin. Servs.,

In re Int'/ Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672,675 (Tex. 2009). In that instance,

a Texas court will not enforce the forum selection clause.

In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 112.

The approach taken by Texas courts arises from the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bremen, 407
U.S. at 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907. There, the United States Supreme Court dealt with an international forum selection
Id.
clause that stated disputes between the parties were to be resolved "before the London Court of Justice."
at 2, 92 S.Ct. 1907. The Court stated, "[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by
Id. at 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907. However, in
Bremen the Supreme Court stated
statute or by judicial decision."
public policy concerns did "not reach" the case and therefore did not hold the clause unenforceable on that ground.
Id. at 15-16, 92 S.Ct. 1907.
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This Court has dealt with the enforceability of a forum selection clause in a case similar to the current case,
though not in the context of arbitration, and applied

Bremen's reasoning to hold the clause unenforceable. See

Cerami-Kate, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 116 Idaho 56, 59-60, 773 P.2d 1143, 1146-47 (1989) . There, the

parties had chosen Florida law to govern interpretation of their agreement.

Id. at 58, 773 P.2d at 1145. This

Court stated that because the "forum selection clause violates the public policy expressed in

I.C. § 29-110, we

conclude that the Florida courts would refuse to enforce the clause."
Id. at 60, 773 P.2d at 1147. In so noting,
this Court quoted language stating that Florida courts would invalidate a forum selection clause if it would violate
a strong public policy in either the forum where suit is brought "or the forum from which suit has been excluded."
Id. (italics altered from original) (quoting

Mar. Ltd. P'ship v. Greenman Advert. Assocs., Inc., 455 So.2d

1121, 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)). The language regarding the "excluded" forum came from the
case in Florida, and is not included in
is brought[.]"

Greenman

Bremen , which only contemplates the policy "of the forum in which suit

MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907 (emphasis added).

First, SBS contends the district court erred because in its decision that the forum selection clause was
unenforceable, the district court cited to

Bremen but included the "excluded" forum language from

Greenman . While the district court misquoted or mis-cited
Bremen , this mistake appears to be only a clerical
error given the court's further analysis. The district court's analysis that follows is proper and applies Texas case

law that has adopted the test articulated in
Bremen. Thus, the incorrect quote or citation does not render the
decision erroneous. In any event, as discussed below, the district *750 **530 court reached the correct outcome
and is therefore affirmed. See Boise Tower Assocs., LLCv. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,782,215 P.3d 494,502 (2009)
("Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the
correct theory.");
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.C., 148 Idaho 638, 645 n.2, 227 P.3d 568, 575
n.2 (2010) (J. Jones dissenting) ("Even if the district court was required to specifically state that the [award] was
based upon the valid assertion ground, the Court can apply the 'right result, wrong reason,' analysis we have often
employed in such circumstances.") (citation omitted).
[21] As noted above, Texas case law states that forum selection clauses will not be enforced when "enforcement
[of the forum selection clause] would contravene a strong public policy of the forum where the suit was brought .... "
In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d at 231-32 ; see also
In re Int'/ Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d
at 67 5. Thus, when the forum where suit is brought has a strong public policy against forum selection clauses,

Texas courts will not enforce such a clause.

In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 112. Indeed, Idaho has a strong

public policy against forum selection clauses as evidenced in
Idaho Code section 29-110(1) which concerns
the "[!]imitations on right to sue under contract or franchise agreement." It provides in relevant part that:

Every stipulation or condition in a contract, by which any party thereto is restricted from
enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho tribunals, or which limits the time within
which he may thus enforce his rights, is void as it is against the public policy of Idaho.
Nothing in this section shall affect contract provisions relating to arbitration so long as the
contract does not require arbitration to be conducted outside the state of Idaho.
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I.C. § 29-110(1). Thus, enforcement of the Dallas forum selection clause would contravene the strong public
policy articulated in

Idaho Code section 29-110(1).

SBS argues that the district court's decision "did not give proper effect to Idaho's choice of law statute" Idaho
Code section 28-l-30l(a). SBS contends that because the parties validly chose Texas law to govern the agreement
in accordance with Section 28-l-30l(a), then the rest ofldaho law no longer applies, and

Section 29-110(1)

would be inapplicable. This argument is unavailing. The parties' selection of Texas law is precisely why
Section
29-110(1) was considered by the district court. As analyzed above, Texas law considers the public policy of the
forum where suit is brought to determine if a forum selection clause is enforceable.

In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc.,

257 S.W.3d at 231-32. Here, T3 brought suit in Idaho. The district court, applying Texas law, cited to
Idaho
Code section 29-110( 1) as evidence of the public policy in Idaho-the forum where suit was brought-disfavoring
forum selection clauses. The district court did not ignore the selection of Texas law, and in fact applied Texas law in
determining whether the forum selection clause was enforceable. Thus, SBS's argument that Section 28-l-30l(a)
was disregarded is without merit.
Lastly, SBS argues that the arbitration award must be vacated under Section 5 of the FAA because Section
5 of the FAA was violated when arbitration did not take place in Dallas. This argument is without merit. Section
5 of the FAA states in pertinent part that, "[i]f in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed .... " 9 U.S.C. § 5. SBS cites
[22]

to

Pao/Re Insurance Corporation v. Organizational Strategies, Incorporated, to support its proposition that

because the arbitrators in this case were not from Dallas the award must be vacated.

783 F.3d 256, 264 (5th

Cir. 2015). This argument is unavailing. First, the United States Supreme Court has held "that

§§ 10 and 11

respectively provide the FAA's exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification."
Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008) . Thus, a claim under Section
5 of the FAA would not provide ground for vacatur. And, in
"arbitrator-selection clauses" and "forum selection clauses[.]"
contained **531

Pao/Re, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between
Id. at 263-65 . "Arbitrator-selection clauses"

*751 "contract-specified method[s]" for selecting arbitrators. See

id. at 263-64 (stating

arbitrator was to be "selected by the Anguilla, B.W.I. Director oflnsurance."); see also
Brook v. Peak Int'/, Ltd.,
294 F.3d 668, 673-74 (5th Cir. 2002) (agreement required AAA submit a list ofnine arbitrators that parties would
take turns crossing off. Instead, AAA submitted a list of fifteen arbitrators and asked parties to strike impermissible
ones, then rank in order of preference). Here, the arbitration agreement stated only that the arbitration would occur
in AAA's Dallas office. It did not contain a contract-specific provision stating how specific arbitrators would be
chosen as in

Pao/Re. Thus, even if Section 5 of the FAA could serve as a basis for vacatur, it does not do so here.

In sum, because enforcement of the parties' Dallas forum selection clause would contravene the strong public
policy articulated in

Idaho Code section 29-110( 1), the forum selection clause is unenforceable under Texas law.

In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 112. The analysis under Section 5 of the FAA does not change this outcome.
Accordingly, the district court did not err when it determined the forum selection clause was unenforceable.
After the district court determined the forum selection clause was unenforceable, it went on to consider whether
the clause was severable from the arbitration agreement, concluding that it was. Thus, the district court stated,

© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

16

T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., 164 Idaho 738 (2019)
435 P.3d 518

the parties were required to arbitrate their claims in accordance with the agreement, absent the forum selection
provision. SBS has not appealed the severability of the clause nor has it offered any argument on appeal that the
district court erred in determining the offending forum selection clause was severable. See Akers v. Mortensen, 160
Idaho 286, 288, 371 P.3d 340, 342 (2016) ("a party waives an appellate issue that is not supported with relevant
argument or authority."). Thus, the district court's determination that the forum selection provision was severable
need not be considered.

C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling SBS's claim of attorney-client privilege.
In March 2016, a few months prior to the arbitration proceeding, the district court ruled on both SBS and T3's
motions to compel documents being withheld pursuant to attorney-client privilege. After an in-camera review and
subsequent hearing, the district court denied SBS's motion to compel but granted T3's motion to compel. SBS
was required to produce 35 email communications between corporate representatives for SBS and its in-house
counsel Michael Dunlap. The district court noted that Dunlap was not only in-house counsel for SBS, but also the
corporate secretary. The court found the majority of the emails at issue concerned factual matters and business
advice made in Dunlap's role as corporate secretary rather than legal issues. On appeal, SBS contends the district
court abused its discretion in ordering it to produce the documents; however, SBS agrees to limit its appeal to the
seven documents that form the crux of this issue. Those documents are Exhibits 157,245,267,327,336,352, and
356. For reasons discussed below, SBS waived its right to appeal the attorney-client privilege issue by stipulating
to the admission of the documents at arbitration.
[23]
[24] As a threshold matter, SBS waived the issue of privilege when it stipulated to the admission of the
email documents at an evidentiary hearing that took place as part of the arbitration proceeding. This Court has
W Heritage Ins. Co.
said that it will not consider issues on appeal that were not objected to at the lower court.
v. Green, 137 Idaho 832, 838, 54 P.3d 948, 954 (2002) . Similarly, this Court has said that, "[n]ormally, a party
State v.
waives an objection to the admission of evidence by failing to object at the time of its admission."
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 64,253 P.3d 727, 738 (2011) . In the context ofa motion in limine, this Court has said that
if "the trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial no further objection is required
Kirk, 141 Idaho at 702, 116 P.3d at 32. However, "[i]f the trial court decides
to preserve the issue for appeal."
to wait and hear the actual foundation laid before determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, the moving

party is required to continue to *752 **532 object as the evidence is presented."

Id. at 701, 116 P.3d at 31.

In this case, prior to arbitration, the district court ruled that the email documents SBS sought to conceal were
not privileged, and thus ordered SBS to produce the documents. However, at arbitration, SBS stipulated to the
admission of the documents. In the Panel's interim award, the Panel states as a preliminary issue that during the
evidentiary hearing "the parties stipulated to the admission of all exhibits except" for seven exhibits which are
not the exhibits at issue in this appeal. Thus, SBS stipulated to the admission of the email exhibits it contends
are privileged.
SBS contends that it was not required to object on privilege grounds at arbitration because the district court had
already ruled that the email documents were not privileged. SBS argues that objecting to the admission of the
documents at arbitration would have "subjected SBS to antagonizing the panel" and cause the panel to "view
SBS's counsel with mistrust and suspicion for trying to get the Panel to rule contrary to the District Court." This
argument is unpersuasive. The district court compelled SBS to produce the email documents to T3; the district
court did not state that the documents had to be admitted at arbitration. Additionally, not only did SBS not object to
Ellington,
the admission of the email documents, but it actually stipulated to their admission at arbitration. See
151 Idaho at 64, 253 P.3d at 738 ("Normally, a party waives an objection to the admission of evidence by failing to

WEST

© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

17

T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., 164 Idaho 738 (2019)
435 P.3d 518

object at the time of its admission."). The approach taken by SBS is disingenuous, as it allows a party to stipulate
to the admission of evidence, then later appeal and predicate error on the admission of that same evidence. Though
SBS cites to

Kirk for the proposition that it did not need to continue to object after the district court ordered it to

produce the emails,

Kirk dealt with the admissibility of evidence prior to trial.

Kirk, 141 Idaho at 702, 116

P.3d at 32.
Kirk did not address a motion to compel during a discovery dispute that results in a court decision
that is prior to, and separate from, an arbitration or court proceeding. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, SBS waived
the privilege issue when it did not object, and instead stipulated to, the admission of the email documents at the
arbitration hearing.

D. The district court did not err in denying SBS's motion to vacate the arbitration award.
In March 2017, the district court granted T3's motion to confirm the arbitration award and denied SBS's motion
to vacate or, alternatively, modify the arbitration award. SBS argues the district court erred in denying its motion
to vacate the award based on the Panel exceeding its powers. Specifically, SBS contends the Panel exceeded its
powers by,

(i) ignoring the parties' choice of Texas law to declare the distributorship "constructively
terminated" based on Connecticut/New Jersey statutes; (ii) irrationally ruling T3 could
recover future losses as if the contract continued while also terminating the contract and
excusing T3 from its post-termination obligations in the contract; (iii) awarding gross
profits in manifest disregard of Texas law requiring proof of "net" loss; (iv) awarding 8-12
years of future damages despite an undisputed month-to-month term of the contract; and
(v) re-writing the contract to award attorneys' fees and expenses on the basis of AAA
procedural rules, and doubling the fees incurred by T3 to award an amount far beyond the
express contractual limit of "actual damages for commercial loss."

T3 contends that SBS has not articulated any proper grounds for vacatur, or alternatively, that SBS's arguments
are without merit. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the district court did not err when it denied SB S's
motion to vacate the arbitration award.
As noted above, the Distributor Agreement provided that "[a]11 matters relating to arbitration will be governed
by the [FAA.]" And, "except to the extent governed by the [FAA] ... or other federal law, this Agreement, the
distributorship and the relationship between [T3] and [SBS]" will be governed by the laws of Texas. The FAA
provides that a court must confirm an arbitration award "unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected
**533 *753 as prescribed in

sections 10 and 11 of this title."

9 U.S.C. § 9.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that, "[u]nder the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator's decision
'only in very unusual circumstances.'"

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568, 133 S.Ct. 2064,

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,942, 115 S.Ct. 1920,
186 L.Ed.2d 113 (2013) (quoting
131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)). The Court explained "[t]hat limited judicial review ... 'maintain[s] arbitration's essential
Id. (quoting
Hall St. Assocs., L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
virtue ofresolving disputes straightaway.' "
576,588, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008)). "If parties could take 'full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals,'
arbitration would become 'merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.'
Id. at 568-69, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting
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[25] Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA allows courts to vacate an arbitration award "where the arbitrators exceeded

their powers .... "

9 U.S.C. § 10. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned, "[a] party seeking relief under

Section 10(a)(4)] bears a heavy burden. 'It is not enough ... to show that the [Arbitration Panel] committed an
error-or even a serious error.'"
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 569, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting
StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'/ Corp., 559 U.S. 662,671, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010)). The Supreme
Court explained that "[b ]ecause the parties 'bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement,' an
arbitral decision 'even arguably construing or applying the contract' must stand, regardless of a court's view of its
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 569, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting
Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp.
(de)merits."
v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62, 121 S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000)). A court may overturn an arbitrator's
decision only when the award" 'simply reflects [the Arbitrator's] own notions of economic justice' rather than
Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated, "[u]nder
§ 10(a)(4), the
'drawing its essence from the contract[.]'"
question for a judge is not whether the arbitrator construed the parties' contract correctly, but whether he construed

it at all."

Id. at 573, 133 S.Ct. 2064.

The Supreme Court continued to elaborate on the heavy burden a party faces in attempting to vacate an arbitration
award under

Section 10(a)(4) by stating,

[sJo long as the arbitrator was "arguably construing" the contract ... a court may not correct his mistakes under
§ 10(a)( 4). The potential for those mistakes is the price of agreeing to arbitration. As we have held before,
we hold again: "It is the arbitrator's construction of the contract which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his." The arbitrator's construction holds, however good,
bad, or ugly.
Id. at 572-73, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (citations omitted).

While
Sections lO(a) and 11 provide the statutory bases for vacatur and modification under the FAA, certain
circuit courts have delineated additional, non-statutory grounds for vacatur including if the award was a manifest
disregard of law, completely irrational, and where an award violates public policy.

Hall St., 552 U.S. at 583-

84, 128 S.Ct. 1396;
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009). However, in
2008 the United States Supreme Court stated that Sections "10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA's exclusive
grounds for expedited vacatur and modification."

Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (emphasis added).

However, the Supreme Court went on to say that "[i]n holding that
§§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes
for the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based
Id. at 590, 128 S.Ct. 1396. Following
on authority outside the statute as well."
developed as to whether the non-statutory grounds for vacatur were still valid.

Hall Street, a circuit split

Some circuit courts, including the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh, follow the approach that non-statutory
grounds for vacatur, including manifest disregard, can no longer form a basis for vacating an award *754 **534
under the FAA following

Hall Street. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "manifest disregard of the law

is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA." Citigroup Glob.
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Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009) ; see also

Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d

120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) 3 (stating in dicta, "[w]e acknowledge the Supreme Court's recent holding in [ Hall
Street] that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in
cases brought under the [FAA]."). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "judicially-created
bases for vacatur are no longer valid in light of
the categorical language of

Hall Street. In so holding, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that

Hall Street compels such a conclusion."

604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010); see also
281, 284 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Th[e] list in [

Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC,

Afjj;max, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d

Section lO(a)] is exclusive; neither judges nor contracting parties can

expand it.").

In contrast, other circuits, including the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth, have not held
Hall Street to
completely foreclose all application of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA. The Ninth Circuit stated,
"[w ]e have already determined that the manifest disregard ground for vacatur is shorthand for a statutory ground
under the FAA .... "

Comedy Club, Inc., 553 F.3d at 1290. It went on to say, "[t]he Supreme Court did not reach

the question of whether the manifest disregard of the law doctrine fits within §§ 10 or 11 of the FAA."

see also

Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'/ Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[

Hall Street] did not,

we think, abrogate the 'manifest disregard' doctrine altogether.") (rev'd on other grounds by
U.S. at 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit said that

Id. ;

Stolt-Nielsen, 559

Hall Street "significantly reduced the ability

offederal courts to vacate arbitration awards for reasons other than those specified in

9 U.S.C. § 10, but it did

not foreclose federal courts' review for an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law."

Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v.

WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415,418 (6th Cir. 2008); see also

Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472,483

(4th Cir. 2012) (stating, "manifest disregard continues to exist as either an independent ground for review or as
a judicial gloss" but not deciding between the two).
Here, SBS argues the arbitration award should be vacated for several reasons including the non-statutory grounds
of manifest disregard of law, complete irrationality, public policy, and the statutory ground of the arbitrators
exceeding their powers. T3 contends that this Court should follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and conclude
that the exclusive grounds for vacatur are in Section 10 of the FAA, relevant here being whether the arbitrators
exceeded their power. SBS responds that its arguments as to manifest disregard oflaw, complete irrationality, and
public policy demonstrate how the arbitrators exceeded their powers, which is a valid ground for vacatur under
Section 10(a)(4). The district court stated it "need not determine which circuit's law governs since [SBS's]
motion would fail under either." Thus, the district court applied the broader Ninth Circuit approach and denied
SB S's motion to vacate, thus confirming the award in full. We need not decide which circuit's approach to take, as
even under the Ninth Circuit approach, which considers the non-statutory grounds for vacatur, SBS's arguments
fail. Each of SBS's arguments is addressed in tum below.

1. Constructive Termination

[26] SBS first argues that the Panel exceeded its power by awarding T3 the value of the distributorship under
a theory of "constructive termination" because it cited to state law outside of Texas. The Panel stated that when
SBS gave the same "exclusive" account protection rights to T3, IBF, and *755 **535 DocuSource, SBS
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"diluted the value" of the Protection Rights given to T3 in the Distributor Agreement. The Panel then stringcited to a Second Circuit case and cases from Connecticut, New Jersey, and Florida. The Panel concluded that
SB S's breach of the Distributor Agreement damaged T3's business so much that the Distributor Agreement now
"fails of its essential purpose" and stated T3 was entitled to constructive termination damages. The district court
stated that the fact that the Panel cited to cases outside of Texas does not mean it failed to apply Texas law in
accordance with the Distributor Agreement. The district court also noted that "while Texas has not expressly
applied a constructive termination theory under the circumstances presented here, [SBS] has not pointed to any
Texas authority contradicting" the Panel's theory which the Panel intentionally ignored. For the reasons to be
discussed, the district court did not err.
First, the Panel awarded the value of the distributorship($ 566,143.61) under three alternative theories: breach
of contract, tortious interference, and the Texas DTPA. However, SBS has only challenged the award under the
"constructive termination" theory, which was analyzed only under the breach of contract section. SBS does not
challenge the award under the tortious interference theory or the Texas DTPA. This Court has said that, "[w]hen a
decision is 'based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence
and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds.' " Andersen v. Prof/
Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) (quoting MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 671,
889 P.2d 103, 105 (Ct. App.1995)). This Court went on to state that because the appellants in Andersen failed to
"challenge on appeal the district court's alternative grounds for granting ... judgment against them, the dismissal
of their case must be affirmed." Id. Here, because SBS only challenges the constructive termination ruling of the
Panel, but not the award of identical damages under the two other theories, the damages can be affirmed on the
unchallenged theory. See id.
[27] Moreover, "manifest disregard ... requires 'something beyond and different from a mere error in the law

or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand and apply the law.' "

Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096,

1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007)). "There must
be some evidence in the record, other than the result, that the arbitrators were aware of the law and intentionally
Id. (quoting Lincoln Nat'/ Life Ins. Co. v. Payne, 374 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2004)). SBS has
disregarded it."
not shown that the Panel manifestly disregarded Texas law, which requires the Panel be "aware of the law and
Id. Here, the Panel states that Texas law governs the agreement and the face of
intentionally disregard[] it."
the arbitration award states that the Panel is awarding damages pursuant to Texas law. The mere fact that other
state cases were cited in the award does not rise to an "intentional disregard" of the law that amounts to manifest

disregard. See

Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104.

As to SBS's argument that T3 did not seek a constructive termination, this argument is without merit. The
Distributor Agreement provides that,

(B) ... THE ARBITRATORS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO AWARD OR INCLUDE
IN THEIR AWARD ANY RELIEF WHICH THEY DEEM PROPER IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, MONEY DAMAGES
(WITH INTEREST ON UNPAID AMOUNTS FROM DATE DUE), SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. PROVIDED THAT THE ARBITRATOR
DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO AWARD EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.

WEST
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Thus, the Distributor Agreement itself states the Panel can "award any relief which [it] deems proper." And, T3
put value of distributorship at issue when it sought revocation of acceptance, and additionally broadly requested
relief as may be available and as justice requires. Thus, the district court did not err in finding the Panel did not
exceed its authority in ordering damages based on constructive termination.

*756 **536 2. Double Recovery
Next, SBS argues the Panel's decision to terminate the contract and award future damages was double recovery and
thus completely irrational. SBS contends the Panel awarded double recovery because T3 received both termination
damages and damages for future losses. The district court stated the future account protection damages were based
on IBF and DocuSource's sales to T3 's protected accounts, while the value of the distributorship damages were
based on T3 's sales to T3 's protected accounts. Thus, the court said, there was no overlap in damages, no double
recovery, and no grounds for vacatur.
Here again, SBS's argument is limited to the Panel's decision under breach of contract damages, but does not
address that the panel awarded these identical damages under the theories of tortious interference and the Texas
DTPA. Regardless, as stated above, the Supreme Court has cautioned, "[a] party seeking relief under [ Section
lO(a)( 4)] bears a heavy burden .... 'It is not enough ... to show that the [Arbitration Panel] committed an error- or
even a serious error.'"

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 186 L.Ed.2d 113

(2013) (quoting
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671, 130 S.Ct. 1758). The Supreme Court explained that "[b]ecause
the parties 'bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement, ' an arbitral decision 'even arguably
construing or applying the contract' must stand, regardless of a court's view of its (de)merits."

Id. (citation

omitted); see also
D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d 532,534 (Tex. App. 2014) (" [A]n arbitrator
does not exceed his authority simply because he may have misinterpreted the contract or misapplied the law.").
[28] Here, SBS simply asks this Court to second guess the district court's analysis. SBS has not carried its "heavy
burden" and shown that the arbitral decision was not "arguably construing or applying the contract" and thus the

decision must stand.
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 569, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (citation omitted). As noted
by the district court, the Panel awarded two categories of damages that were not duplicative. And, the "elements
of damages are clearly derived from the parties' agreement." Thus, the Panel did not exceed its authority, and the
district court did not err in so determining.

3. Gross Profits
SBS next argues the Panel manifestly disregarded Texas law when it awarded lost commissions based on gross
profits rather than T3 's net commission. The district court stated that the Panel accepted the calculations from
Robert Taylor, T3's expert, who calculated the unpaid commission amount by taking "the product retail price
paid to IBF and DocuSource by T3's protected customer on each infringing order and deduct[ing] therefrom the
IBF and DocuSource's base price for the product[.]" The court went on to say that there was no indication the
Panel manifestly disregarded the law in "accepting Mr. Taylor's calculations. Rather, it found that the unrotated
commissions earned by IBF and DocuSource on sales made to T3 's protected accounts qualified as direct contract
damages to T3 .... The Panel never indicated it was awarding such damages as lost profits." The district court
concluded SBS had not shown that the arbitrators recognized the correct law and refused to apply it, as is required
to satisfy manifest disregard.

WEST
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[29]

[30] As noted, "manifest disregard requires 'something beyond and different from a mere error in the law

or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand and apply the law.' "

Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104 (quoting

Collins, 505 F.3d at 879). "There must be some evidence in the record, other than the result, that the arbitrators

were aware of the law and intentionally disregarded it."

Id. (quoting Payne, 374 F.3d at 675). And, "[s]o long

as the arbitrator was 'arguably construing' the contract ... a court may not correct his mistakes under

§ l0(a)

Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569
(4) . The potential for those mistakes is the price of agreeing to arbitration."
U.S. at 572- 73, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (citations omitted)." 'It is the arbitrator's construction of the contract which was
bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no

business overruling him because their interpretation **537 *757 of the contract is different from his."
(citation omitted).

Id.

[31] Here, as noted by the district court, the Panel stated in awarding damages that "[e]ach of T3's damage
categories are recoverable under Texas law because they are actual damages for commercial loss that naturally
flow from and were reasonably foreseeable consequences of SBS's breach." SBS has not carried its burden in

showing the Panel recognized the correct law and intentionally disregarded it. See
Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104.
Rather, the Panel accepted the calculations of T3's expert, and stated it was awarding damages pursuant to Texas
law. Thus, the district court did not err when it determined the Panel did not exceed its authority.

4. Future lost commissions
[32] Next, SBS argues the Panel manifestly disregarded the month-to-month nature of the contract to award future
lost commissions to T3. SBS contends the Panel erred when it accepted Mr. Taylor's calculations based on the
"one times annual revenue metric" as T3 's future losses were limited to the monthly term of the contract. The
Panel stated that SBS "uses a metric of approximately one times annual revenue when it acquires distributors"
and that metric was the same used when Teply purchased part of Thurston's business. The Panel then stated it
"finds that T3 and Taylor's use of the one times annual revenue metric fairly represents the present value of future
commission rights." In so finding, the Panel cited to Texas law, AZZ Inc. v. Morgan, 462 S.W.3d 284, 289- 90
(Tex. App. 2015) (discussing Texas law on lost profits). The district court stated that "the Panel evidently found
Mr. Taylor's proffered metric satisfied" the standard articulated in Morgan . Thus, the district court stated SBS had
not shown the Panel manifestly disregarded the law; rather, SBS had only shown that the Panel "did not follow
SBS's proposed measure of damages."

Here again, the analysis is the same as that for lost profits analyzed above. SBS has not carried its burden
in showing the Panel recognized the correct law and intentionally disregarded it. See
Bosack, 586 F.3d at
1104. Rather, the Panel cited to Texas law that supports its acceptance of Mr. Taylor's calculations of lost future
commissions. Thus, the district court did not err when it determined the Panel did not exceed its authority.

5. Doubling the award of attorney fees
Lastly, SBS argues the Panel disregarded Texas law to award T3 doubled attorney fees and expenses. The Panel
awarded T3 $ 2,449,208.14 in attorney fees and$ 437,126.28 in costs. The Panel stated it "finds that an award
of attorneys' fees and expenses is authorized by Texas law, under the Distributor Agreement, and because such a
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determination was submitted to the Panel by the parties." The Panel also stated Section 21(B) of the Distributor
Agreement provides that "the arbitrators shall have the right to award or include in their award any relief which
they deem proper in the circumstances." And, that"[AAA] Rule 47(c) provides that the Panel 'may apportion such
fees, expenses, and compensation among the parties in such amounts as the arbitrator determines is appropriate.' "
SBS argues the Panel could not rely on AAA Rule 47 and that the doubled attorney fee amount violates the
contractual limit of actual damages for commercial loss. The district court stated that SBS could not establish that
the Panel had manifestly disregarded the law or that its decision was completely irrational. The court reasoned
that the Panel was interpreting the Distributor Agreement as regards to fees and costs "and applied the law in
accordance with its interpretation. While Safeguard argues that the distributorship agreement requires that Texas
law-and only Texas law-governs the determination of fees and costs, the Panel found otherwise." The district
court also noted that the choice-of-law provision specifying Texas law does not state it will apply to a post-hearing
determination of fees by an arbitrator. Instead, the court reasoned, such determination of fees was governed by
21(B) which allows arbitrators to award "any relief which they deem proper in the circumstances." Thus, the court
stated, because the Panel had interpreted the parties' agreement, the Panel's *758 **538 construction would
not be vacated by the district court.

[33] Here again, "[i]t is not enough ... to show that the [Arbitration Panel] committed an error-or even a serious
error."
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 569, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (quoting
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at
671, 130 S.Ct. 1758). "Because the parties 'bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement,' an
arbitral decision 'even arguably construing or applying the contract' must stand, regardless of a court's view of
its (de)merits."
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 569, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (citation omitted). And, "manifest
disregard ... requires 'something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the
arbitrators to understand and apply the law.'"
Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104 (quoting
Collins, 505 F.3d at 879).
"There must be some evidence in the record, other than the result, that the arbitrators were aware of the law and
intentionally disregarded it."

Id. (quoting Payne, 374 F.3d at 675).

[34] In this case, the Panel was "arguably construing or applying the contract" as it referenced various provisions

in the Distributor Agreement, and that it was applying them. See
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 569 U.S. at 569,
133 S.Ct. 2064. And, there is no evidence that the arbitrators "were aware of the law and intentionally disregarded
it."
Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104 (citation omitted). Rather, the Panel stated it "finds that an award of attorneys'
fees and expenses is authorized by Texas law, under the Distributor Agreement, and because such a determination
was submitted to the Panel by the parties." Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining SBS has not
carried its burden in showing the Panel exceeded its authority in ordering doubled attorney fees.

E. We do not award attorney fees on appeal.
Both parties request costs on appeal, but only T3 requests attorney fees on appeal. Because SBS does not request
attorney fees, and because SBS is not the prevailing party, SBS is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. T3
contends it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Texas law for both its breach of contract and Texas DTPA
claims "upon a remand back to the Arbitration Panel." T3 also contends this Court can award it attorney fees under
Idaho Code section 12-121 or Texas Appellate Rule 45 , which both allow for attorney fees in frivolous appeals.
For the reasons discussed below, we do not award attorney fees on appeal.

[35]

[36] T3 cites to

Cap Rock Electric Cooperative Incorporated v. Texas Utilities Electric Company which

states, "once a right to attorney's fees is established, the award may include attorney's fees for any appeal."
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S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex. App. 1994). However,

Cap Rock was not dealing with an award of attorney fees on appeal

following arbitration.
Id. Furthermore, T3's argument ignores Texas case law stating that underlying causes of
action dealt with in arbitration merge into the award and no longer form the statutory basis for an award of fees.
See Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 785 (Tex. App. 1994), as supplemented on denial of reh'g (May 12, 1994).
Similarly, when an arbitration award contains an award of attorney fees "a trial court may not award additional
attorney fees for enforcing or appealing the confirmation of the award .... " Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d
422,436 (Tex. App. 2004). Perhaps recognizing this, T3 states it can be awarded fees "upon a remand back to the
Arbitration Panel." However, T3 cites no authority for such a remand. Accordingly, based on the lack of statutory
support in the FAA, as well as Texas case law, T3 is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to its breach
of contract and Texas DTPA claims.

[37]
[38] We also decline to award attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 or Texas
Appellate Rule 45 . This Court has said "if the award of attorney fees is a discretionary matter governed by statute,
then it is considered to be procedural, requiring application of the forum law." Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148
Idaho 261, 270, 220 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2009). Texas Appellate Rule 45 provides that if a court "determines that an
appeal is frivolous, it may ... award each prevailing party just damages." Tex. R. App. P. 45 . While not statutory, the
*759 **539 Rule does impute discretion to the court. Thus, this Court could apply section 12-121.
Houston
v. Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 911, 216 P.3d 1272, 1283 (2009). Pursuant to section 12-121 , this Court, in any civil
action, may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. LC. § 12-121 ;
Doe v. Doe (2016-7), 161
Idaho 67, 79,383 P.3d 1237, 1249 (2016) . "This Court has held that attorney fees can be awarded on appeal under
Idaho Code section 12-121 'only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation.' "

Id. (citation omitted). However, "[f]ees will generally not be awarded for arguments that are

based on a good faith legal argument."

Easterlingv. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902,918,367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016).

In this case, we decline to award attorney fees on appeal. The issues as to district court jurisdiction and forum
selection clause enforceability are novel issues and SBS provided cogent argument and authority for its issues
presented on appeal. SBS's arguments were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Accordingly, we
do not award attorney fees on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that 1) the district court had jurisdiction to consider T3 's challenge to forum; 2) the district court
did not err when it determined the forum selection clause was unenforceable; 3) SBS waived the issue of privilege
when it stipulated to the admission of documents at the hearing; 4) the district court did not err in denying SB S's
motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award; and 5) no attorney fees are awarded on appeal. Costs to T3.

Justices HORTON, BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER concur.

All Citations
164 Idaho 738,435 P.3d 518
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Footnotes
Later, at an arbitration evidentiary hearing, SBS conceded this attempted waiver of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA) was ineffective and unenforceable.
2

We note that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Henry Schein, Incorporated, et al., v.
Archer and White Sales, Incorporated, 586 U.S.--, 139 S.Ct. 524, 202 L.Ed.2d 480 (2019) does not
impact our analysis. In
Henry Schein , the Supreme Court addressed the "wholly groundless" exception
applied by some federal courts to avoid sending a claim to arbitration when the "argument for arbitration
is wholly groundless."
Id. at 528. The Supreme Court held the "wholly groundless" exception to be
inconsistent with the FAA and reiterated that when a contract delegates arbitrability to an arbitrator, the
court may not override that contractual agreement.

Id. at 528. However, the Court also reaffirmed that

such delegation to an arbitrator must do so by "clear and unmistakable" evidence.

3

Id. at 530. (quoting

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-46, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985
(1995)). As discussed above, in this case, there was not a clear and unmistakable delegation of authority to
the arbitrator based on the conflict between provisions 2l(B) and 2l(C) in the arbitration agreement.
However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals more recently stated, "[w]e need not and do not decide now
whether manifest disregard remains as an available basis for vacatur. However, if it does survive, we agree
with the courts that have held that
gloss on

End of Document

§ 10."

Hall Street compels the conclusion that it does so only as a judicial

Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec. ofPuerto Rico, Inc., 852 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2017).
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Cerami-Kate, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 116 Idaho 56 (1989)
773 P.2d 1143

116 Idaho 56
Supreme Court of Idaho.
CERAMI-KOTE, INC., an Idaho corporation; Washington Ceramic Coatings, Inc., a
foreign corporation; Thermal Coatings of Seattle, Inc., a foreign corporation; Thermal
Coatings of Sacramento, Inc., a foreign corporation; Gary D. Adams and Mary E. Adams,
husband and wife; Don Bunn and Jeanine Bunn, husband and wife; Marvin Flaherty;
K.E. Duncan and Marjorie L. Duncan, husband and wife; Ronald C. Duncan and
Cathleen C. Duncan, husband and wife; and Richard Thurber, Plaintiffs-Respondents,
V.

ENERGYWAVE CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; Ziebarth
Corporation, a foreign corporation; Richard G. Ziebarth and
Beatrice E. Ziebarth, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants,
and
Permatherm Incorporated, an Idaho corporation, Defendant.
No. 16983.
I
May 8, 1989.
Synopsis
Appeal was taken from order of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Bannock County, William H. Woodland, J.,
which denied motion to dismiss for improper venue. The Supreme Court, Bistline, J., held that: (1) in accordance
with choice of law provision in contract, Florida law should have been applied, and (2) under Florida law, forum
selection clause would not be enforced in view of Idaho statute voiding such provisions.
Affirmed.
Shepard, C.J., filed a specially concurring opinion.
Procedural Posture(s): Motion to Dismiss.

West Headnotes (3)

[1]

Contracts

Agreements Relating to Actions and Other Proceedings in General

Right of the party to choose the law to be applied to their agreement is limited by requirements that the
chosen state bear a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction. LC.§ 28-1-105(1).
8 Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

Contracts

What Law Governs

Florida law would be applied to determine validity of forum selection clause in contract which provided
that Florida law would govern the contract where the two parties to the contracts were corporations
organized under the laws of Florida, both maintained their principal place of business in Florida, and
performance of obligations under the contract would take place in part in Florida. LC. § 28- 1- 105(1 ).
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14 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Contracts

Agreements Relating to Actions and Other Proceedings in General

Under Florida law, forum selection provision of contract would not be enforced with respect to suit
brought in Idaho in view of Idaho statute voiding forum selection contracts.

I.C. § 29- 110.

22 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
**1144 *57 Green, Service, Gasser & Kerl, Pocatello, for defendants-appellants. Steven V. Richert, argued.
Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-respondents. John R. Goodell, argued.

Opinion
BISTLINE, Justice.
This action grows out of a business relationship between Energywave Corporation (Energywave), a manufacturer
and distributor of a ceramic insulation system, and the numerous plaintiffs set out in the caption above.
Energywave Corporation granted licenses to sell, market, distribute, and install the roofing sealant which it had
developed. Plaintiffs filed an action in Bannock County alleging various contractual, tort, and statutory violations.
Energywave filed a motion to dismiss based upon contractual language which selected the law of Florida as the
law to be applied to the contract and which designated a particular county court in Florida as the venue for the
enforcement, construction, or interpretation of the contract.
Energywave is the successor-in-interest to Ziebarth Corporation. Both companies are incorporated under the laws
of Florida and both maintain their principal place of business in Citrus County, Florida. Energywave manufactures
and distributes a roofing sealant. The plaintiffs are corporations and individuals incorporated or residing in the
states of Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and California.
The contract into which the parties entered contained the following language which Energywave's motion to
dismiss seeks to enforce:
13. VENUE.
ZIEBARTH and CONTRACTOR hereby specifically agree that the venue for the enforcement, construction, or
interpretation of this agreement shall be the Circuit Court of Citrus County, Florida, and the parties do hereby
specifically waive any venue privilege and/or diversitive citizenship privilege which they have or may have,
and the parties, jointly and severally, do hereby waive any right which they have or may have against to institute
any proceedings in connection with this agreement, in any other county of the state of Florida, in any other
state, **1145 *58 court, other than the Circuit Court of Citrus County, Florida.

20. APPLICABLE LAW.
THIS agreement shall be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the state of Florida.
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The plaintiffs have sold and applied the Ziebarth insulation system to many customers' buildings, including many
in Idaho. Their complaint alleges a substantial number of failures of the defendants' product by reason of which
the numerous plaintiffs have been required to do additional repairs or replacements of defective applications. On
August 6, 1986, the plaintiffs filed a complaint and demand for a jury trial in Bannock County. The complaint
alleged various breaches of contract, tort, and statutory violations.
Energywave appeared in the action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) and on September 19, 1986, filed a motion to
dismiss asserting that the Idaho court should decline jurisdiction and uphold the choice of forum based on the
contractual language cited above. The district court denied this motion to dismiss. We granted permission for
an appeal by Energywave from the court's interlocutory order. This appeal requires us to determine whether the
district court erred in denying the motion.
Energywave's appeal presents the following two issues:
1. Did the district court err in not applying the choice of law provision in the parties' contract?
2. Assuming that the district court did not err in failing to apply the choice of law provision, did the court err,
in applying Idaho law, by concluding that
clause in the contract?

Idaho Code § 29- 110 bars enforcement of the forum selection

[1] Idaho Code§ 28- 1- 105(1) provides that parties to commercial transactions have the power to choose the
applicable law governing their transaction:

Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation
to this state and also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either
of this state or such other state or nation shall cover their rights and duties. Failing such
agreement, this act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to the state. 1

I.C. § 28- 1- 105(1) (1980).
[2] Here the parties' agreement in clause 20 quoted above, provided that their contract shall be interpreted,
construed and governed by the laws of Florida. It cannot be doubted that Florida bears a reasonable relation to
the transaction. Energywave and Ziebarth are corporations organized under the laws of Florida, and both maintain
their principal place of business in Florida. The performance of Energywave's obligations under the contract would
take place, at least in part, in Florida. Therefore, Florida bears a reasonable relation to the transaction and the
district court technically should have applied Florida law expressly to determine the validity of the forum selection
clause in the contract. Although the court was in error in not so doing, the result that the district court reached is
the same that we reach today as discussed below.
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II

[3]

Florida law also recognizes that contracting parties can agree on what state's law is to apply to the

agreement.
Maritime Limited Partnership v. Greenman Advertising Associates, Inc., 455 So.2d 1121 (Fla.App.
4th Dist.1984). The question then becomes how the Florida courts regard the enforceability of forum selection

**1146 *59 clauses. 2 Fortunately this question has been definitively resolved by the Florida Supreme Court.

In
Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437 (Fla.1986), the Florida high court squarely addressed this issue and
resolved a conflict among the circuits of that state's intermediate appellate courts. Previously one line of decisions
had held that forum selection clauses were void as impermissible attempts to oust a court of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

Zurich Insurance Co. v. Allen, 436 So.2d 1094 (Fla.App. 3rd Dist.1983). Another line of cases represented by
Maritime, cited above, had held that parties to a contract may agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the chosen
forum under certain conditions.

In

Maritime, the Florida Court of Appeals relied upon and adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the

United States in

MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) . The

Maritime court viewed
clauses to be enforceable:

Bremen as imposing three conditions which must exist in order for forum selection

1. The forum was not chosen because of overwhelming bargaining power on the part of one party which would
constitute overreaching at the other's expense.
2. Enforcement would not contravene a strong policy enunciated by statute or judicial fiat, either in the forum
where the suit would be brought, or the f arum from which the suit has been excluded.
3. The purpose was not to transfer an essentially local dispute to a remote and alien forum in order to seriously
inconvenience one or both of the parties.

Maritime, 45 5 So.2d 1121, 1123 ( emphasis added).

In

Manrique, the Florida Supreme Court expressly adopted the view enunciated in
Manrique, 493 So.2d 437,440, and overruled the line of cases represented by

Bremen and

Maritime.

Zurich, 436 So.2d 1094. The

Maritime conditions one and three are not here in dispute. What is at issue, however, is whether
LC. § 29-110
expresses a strong public policy against the enforcement of foreign selection clauses which would run afoul of
Maritime's condition two. The statute provides as follows:
Limitations on rights to sue. -Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is restricted
from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual proceedings in the original tribunals, or which limits
the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void.
This statute has been interpreted to render unenforceable a clause in a promissory note which provided for venue in
a county other than that designated by the relevant venue statute.

McCarty v. Herrick, 41 Idaho 529,240 P. 192

(1925). Similarly, we conclude that the forum selection clause in this case cannot stand in light of
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This conclusion finds support in a recent Montana case,

State ex rel Polaris Industries v. District Court, 695

P.2d 471 (Mont.1985). The Montana court, interpreting a statute virtually identical to
I.C. § 29-110, held that
the statute operated to void a forum selection clause in a contract which mandated an out-of-state forum. (See also,

Rose v. Etling, 255 Or. 395, 467 P.2d 633 (1970), wherein the court ruled that a specific statute providing for
protection of the usual remedies granted to the buyer by statute under a retail installment sales contract operated
to void a venue selection clause included in the retail installment sales contract of the seller.)
Although Judge Woodland did not specifically reference Florida law in his memorandum decision, he did apply

MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Company, cited above, which provides the analysis adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court in
court.

Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437 (Fla.1986). Thus we reach the same result as the district

**1147 *60 In conclusion, although technically it may have been error to not specifically apply Florida law,
nonetheless the same analysis was applied by Judge Woodland as would have been applied by the Florida courts.
As discussed above, Florida law recognizes that one of the factors invalidating a forum selection clause in a
contract is that the clause would violate a strong public policy either in the forum where the suit would be brought
or the forum from which the suit has been excluded. See
Maritime Ltd. Partnership v. Greenman Advertising
Associates, 455 So.2d 1121, 1123. Since we determine that this forum selection clause violates the public policy
expressed in
I.C. § 29-110, we conclude that the Florida courts would refuse to enforce the clause. Thus, we
affirm the district court.
Costs to plaintiffs; no attorney fees on appeal.

JOHNSON, J., and McQUADE and WALTERS, JJ. Pro Tern., concur.
SHEPARD, Chief Judge, specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that the selection ofldaho as the forum is correct. In my
view, the majority opinion clearly notes that the contract in question here provides for venue in Florida for any
litigation arising out of the agreement. The majority correctly holds that nevertheless, venue in Idaho is proper.
However, as also set forth in the majority opinion, paragraph twenty of the contract provides: "This agreement
shall be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the state of Florida." The majority opinion states that
two issues are presented by this appeal, and both issues as stated, relate to the contract's "choice oflaw" provision.
It is my view that the decision of the district court, and the various assertions of the parties before this Court, deal
only with the choice offorum, and not the "choice oflaw." Hence, it is my view that when the cause is remanded to
the district court as being the correct forum, nevertheless, the question of the application of either Idaho or Florida
law remains for resolution by the trial court. I believe the issue as to which law is to be applied, Idaho or Florida,
is not necessarily academic in the instant case because of the variety of allegations by plaintiff, such as breach of
various portions of the contract, failure of consideration, rescission of the contract based on mutual mistakes, and
for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of express implied warranties, and of particular significance, violations
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48- 601 et seq.
For the above reasons I concur in the holding of the majority that the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss
was correct on the basis that venue in Idaho was correct. In my view, the question as to which state law would
govern in the action is not before this Court, and remains for resolution by the trial court.
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Footnotes
In non-commercial situations, the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187 ( 1971) provides that
contracting parties may choose the law to be applied to their agreement. However, certain restrictions may
limit the choice. For instance, the chosen state must bear a substantial relationship to the parties or the

2

transaction; and the Restatement advances a public policy exception similar to that of MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) .
For a comprehensive discussion of such clauses, See, Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International
and Interstate Commercial Agreement, 1982 U.Ill.L.Rev. 133 (1982). See also, Annotation, Validity of
Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 ALR 4th (1984).
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